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


DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Mao's "Cultural Revolution"
III. The Purge of the P.L.A.
and the Stardom of Madame Mao

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47

June 1968

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Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79B01737A001900040001-7

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP79B01737A001900040001-7

MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

III. THE PURGE OF THE P.L.A. AND THE STARDOM OF MADAME MAO

This staff study is one of a series growing out of continuing SRS surveillance of the China scene. The first of this particular series, "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Its Leadership, Its Strategy, Its Instruments, and Its Casualties" (February 1967), concluded that the Cultural Revolution was primarily a purge, carried out with special instruments. The second, "The P.L.A. and the 'Cultural Revolution'" (October 1967), concentrated on Mao's use of the P.L.A. as an instrument of the "revolution" and on his reorganization of the P.L.A. itself to make it "reliable" in that role.

The present study traces the story to June 1968. It finds Mao to be still the central and dominant figure, but it devotes special attention to the way in which Mao's treatment of the P.L.A. has seemed to work against his ends by provoking resentment among those upon whom his position directly depends, by narrowing his base of support to fanatics and opportunists, and by putting his own position in danger. These trends are highlighted by the activities and status of Madame Mao, who has become one of the principal leaders and has played the starring role in purging the P.L.A.

This study, like its predecessors in the series, is not a coordinated paper; it is a result of the research and analysis of a single staff analyst. Comments are invited.

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Chief, DDI Special Research Staff

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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

III. THE PURGE OF THE P.L.A. AND THE STARDOM OF MADAME MAO

Summary and Conclusions

The People's Liberation Army (P.L.A., meaning the armed forces as a whole) has been both an instrument and an object of the "cultural revolution" in China. As an instrument, it has been used to protect Mao against his enemies, to protect and support the militant mass forces of the revolution and to keep them within limits, and to govern China until a new party apparatus can be built. Thus the PLA has been--and remains--the apparatus on which Mao's team primarily depends. But to make it "reliable" in that role, it has also been an object of the revolution--suffering a prolonged purge (in installments) which has radically reorganized the high command, claiming as victims half of its central leaders and many of its regional and provincial leaders, and threatening to strike down more.

Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, a former bit player in the movies and now about 55, has been the scourge of the PLA. While Mao and Lin have had the main roles in guiding the PLA as an instrument, the Madame too has had an important role. Moreover, she has been the main source of militant exhortation to the revolutionary mass organizations and has thus greatly complicated the tasks of the PLA in controlling and governing. Of greatest importance, the Madame has played her first starring role in carrying out the purge of the PLA on the lines drawn by Mao and Lin--lines which have apparently permitted the Madame to exercise a good deal of initiative, perhaps subject only to review by Mao and Lin. The Madame has dominated the special instruments of the purge and has taken the public lead in almost every stage, and in the course of this she has risen spectacularly in the Peking hierarchy.

She has been quick to break those who opposed her. Even Mao's top two lieutenants, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, recognize her as dangerous. And Mao's use of the Madame has actually increased the danger to his own position.

Madame Mao began her rise in November 1965, when Mao used her to plant a denunciatory article which opened the "cultural revolution." The PLA's chief-of-staff was soon purged as an immediate threat, but, before undertaking any large-scale purge of the PLA, Mao assigned the Madame to look into its political condition. Following this exercise, Mao made clear that a purge of the PLA as well as of the party lay ahead, and set up at that time a special instrument--the central Cultural Revolution Group--to conduct the purge of the party; Madame Mao was named its first deputy chairman, and brought several proteges with her.

In August 1966, Lin Piao announced the criteria for judging PLA leaders--demonstrated support of Mao, and fidelity to his thought. At first he gave the responsibility for conducting the purge to conventional organs (the Military Affairs Commission and the General Political Department) and to PLA officers (Yang Cheng-wu and Hsiao Hua). In October, however, the "cultural revolution" in the PLA moved into a higher gear, and another Cultural Revolution Group was formed for the PLA alone; the Madame became advisor and de facto chief of this PLA/CRG, and thus the only person to have a leading role in both the central CRG and the PLA/CRG.

The Madame began at once to subvert the work of the nominal chief of the PLA/CRG, and to go after bigger game. In December she got it, denouncing Ho Lung, the second-ranking officer of the MAC and the reputed central figure of the first large group of PLA leaders to be purged. The Madame's denunciation of a key figure for "rightist" errors and factional activity, followed by the purge of that leader and his associates, was to be the pattern throughout the purge of the PLA.

In January 1967 Madame Mao took the lead in directly attacking the chief of the PLA/CRG and announced (on Mao's authority) the reorganization of that group, placing it under an elderly marshal, naming the two original supervisors of the purge--Yang and Hsiao--as his deputies, and adding Lin Piao's wife. The Madame and other leaders soon began criticizing Hsiao, but gave him another chance.

In late January, the great disorder resulting from the call for "revolutionary rebels" to "seize power" made it necessary for the PLA to intervene, under the slogan of "Support the Left." Because Mao urgently required the PLA's cooperation at that time, he reassured the PLA that he did not mean to purge it on the same scale as the party.

However, the PLA tended to suppress trouble-makers of all sorts--including "rebel" groups favored by Peking--and the PLA itself thus became part of what was judged by the Maoists to be an "adverse [rightist] current" in the revolution as a whole. In late March the PLA was put back on the leash, restricted in its use of coercion, and directed not to act at all without orders from above. The Madame again dismissed the head of the PLA/CRG. His post was reportedly divided among Yang and Hsiao (his two deputies) and Hsieh Fu-chih (the public security chief), with the Madame remaining as the real leader. These three officers and Su Yu (coordinator of defense research) were named to the standing committee of the MAC, displacing as active leaders of the MAC the five marshals below Lin Piao.

During the spring of 1967, PLA leaders in the regions and provinces came under increasing attack by the "rebels," and by May the leaders in Peking apparently felt it was necessary to issue directives curbing the "rebels." However, the PLA was not given authority to use the necessary force, and great disorder continued.

Mao's team in Peking chose to deal with this disorder--and with political resistance in the PLA--by sending a small delegation under Hsieh Fu-chih to the worst trouble-spots during July. This delegation found the

Wuhan headquarters to be insubordinate both in its past handling of mass organizations and in its present treatment of the delegation. This latter action enraged and alarmed the leaders in Peking, notably the Madame. The Wuhan commander was quickly replaced, and the Madame called on the "rebels" to arm themselves against other mass organizations which--with the possible support of PLA officers--might wish to harm them. PLA regional commanders were summoned to Peking in late July for a lecture on discipline, and the CRG-controlled party journal called for a further purge of the PLA. Lin Piao in early August again told the PLA that in dealing with mass revolutionary organizations it was not to act without orders from Peking, and the MAC at that time set up a special "Support the Left" Group (under Hsieh Fu-chih) to guide the efforts of PLA commanders in handling these organizations.

At the same time, Lin Piao and Madame Mao, needing a scapegoat for the failure of the PLA commanders in the spring and early summer to respond as Mao wished to the confusing and disabling orders from Peking, now moved against Hsiao Hua. Hsiao was purged, and his General Political Department was set aside. Shortly thereafter, the PLA/CRG--of which Hsiao had been one of the directors--was again reorganized. It was now placed under Wu Fashien, commander of the politically reliable Air Force, with Madame Mao remaining as "advisor" and Lin Piao's wife moving toward the top.

However, the leadership was not yet willing to call off the "rebels," and its own criticism of the PLA led swiftly to intensified "rebel" action against local military commanders and to increased disorder. Taking account of this and of PLA resentment, Mao's team soon felt impelled to repudiate the line taken since late July. The Madame in particular did so--presumably on orders from Mao--in a speech of 5 September in which she reversed herself, defended the PLA, criticized the "rebels," withdrew her incitement of them to seize arms, and encouraged the PLA to restore order. On the same date, the MAC and the central CRG authorized the PLA to use force to repel attempts by mass organizations to seize weapons from the PLA.

Later in September, Mao's team went further to placate the PLA. Three second-level figures of the central CRG--just below the Madame--were purged as "ultra-leftists." Madame Mao, although one of those responsible for the harsh and threatening line of July and August for which these three were made the scapegoats, was given credit by other leaders for discovering the "errors" of the three; again she took the lead in attacking those discredited.

By October, the worst of the disorders had apparently abated, and speeches by the leaders (e.g., Lin Piao) indicated an intention to give the PLA a respite from the purge while it restored and maintained order throughout China. The situation remained volatile, however. Some versions of Mao's own "instructions" condoned violence and disruption in undefined circumstances, and "rebel" organizations hostile to one another remained in existence and in official favor.

The uneasy calm was short-lived. On 12 November, Madame Mao made several statements which could be and were read by militant rebels as a justification for resuming violence and attacking "people in authority." Those "rebel" groups which did this found that they could get away with it--that the PLA, rightly afraid of Mao's reaction, would not use the necessary force against them; and the word quickly spread. After mid-November, violence substantially increased.

This disorder continued through the winter of 1967-68. In at least some cases, contrary to the September directive, local PLA commanders were ordered not to use force even to prevent seizures of arms. And they were not permitted to suppress the increasingly serious fighting among "rebel" organizations which the seized arms made possible. Although the militant leaders of the "cultural revolution"--principally Mao, Lin, and the Madame--made a conciliatory gesture to the PLA by purging another of the "ultra-left" second-level figures of the central CRG who had offended the PLA, these party leaders did not alter the policies--the real source of the trouble--which restricted the PLA's actions.

At about this time, perhaps by design of Lin Piao in order to dilute Madame Mao's power, three new work groups were established in the PLA to carry on the tasks of political surveillance once performed by the discredited General Political Department. The most important of these --the political work group--was apparently either to supplement or to replace Madame Mao's PLA/CRG. There is some evidence that Yang Cheng-wu was given the job of supervising this new group. If so, the Madame may have seen Yang as a threat to her position as the principal person reporting to Mao and Lin on the political reliability of senior PLA officers.

The next wave of the purge was to hit Yang Cheng-wu himself, along with two other high-ranking officers (the first political officer of the Air Force and the Peking Garrison Commander). All that is clear about this case is that the three ran directly afoul of Madame Mao. Official materials on the case give the impression--perhaps falsely--that Yang and the Air Force leader were purged primarily for having questioned the judgment of Mao, Lin Piao, and Madame Mao, and for having tried to do something about it. (If so, this could have happened in connection with the work of the new political work group.) The two had also come into conflict--for this reason or some other--with two other strong leaders, Hsieh Fu-chih and Wu Fa-hsien, with whom the Madame worked closely in purging the PLA, and possibly with some of the regional commanders. Yang and the garrison commander brought matters to a head on the night of 7-8 March, when they allegedly tried to "arrest" some people on the premises of the central CRG. Madame Mao was credited with "bravely" preventing the arrests. The three, along with many other military leaders, immediately disappeared from the news.

Mao's team--including Madame Mao--immediately launched a new offensive against the "rightists." The Madame defined the "main danger" throughout China as the rightist effort to "reverse verdicts," and in a series of meetings she and others warned audiences in Peking and delegations from other parts of China of the danger of a new "adverse [rightist] current." On at least one

occasion, the Madame and others rebuked some regional military leaders for rightist attitudes.

At a 25 March meeting, the PLA was informed of the purge of Yang Cheng-wu and the others and of the appointment of Huang Yung-sheng (like Yang, a long-time lieutenant of Lin Piao's) as the new chief-of-staff and of Huang's former deputy as the new garrison commander.

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At a 27 March rally, the recent challenge to Madame Mao personally was again emphasized, and extreme deference to the Madame was again shown by other leaders.

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While Peking's campaign against factionalism in mass organizations had led to a reduction in violence by early March, now in early April Peking redefined "factionalism" in such a way as to make "proletarian" factionalism a good thing. This, together with the campaign against the "rightists," encouraged "rebel" groups to become militant and troublesome again. From several points there were reports of renewed heavy fighting and of fresh poster attacks on military leaders.

On May Day, Mao's team made a show of both the militant and the moderate features of its policies, with the militant dominant. This was true both of the official pronouncements and of the line-up of leaders, which displayed strikingly the militants--including Madame Mao--who had risen in and on the "revolution." The militant leaders were displayed even more strikingly in the small group--of 13 or 14--presented on two other occasions in May as Mao's first team.

As of late May 1968, the casualties of the purge of the PLA had already been heavy. Of the 65 top positions in the central military leadership, the occupants

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of at least 35 posts (28 individuals) had apparently been purged; half of these were military commanders, half political specialists. The purge had claimed many victims as well in the regional and provincial commands; comparatively few of these, however, were military commanders, and many had survived the kind of "rebel" attacks which had preceded the downfall of political figures.

The "cultural revolution" has continued to display Mao's conviction of the absolute correctness of his "thought", central to which is his belief in the power of the fanatical revolutionary will, and his obsessive concern with developing "revolutionary successors" who will be faithful to that "thought." The revolution has also continued to highlight such features of Mao's character as his boundless vanity, his increasingly paranoid suspicion, and his vindictiveness. The mark of his style is on virtually every concept and tactic of the "revolution"; contradictory aspects of his "thought" are established as policy; fantasies are held up as realities; losses are defined as gains; equivocal directives confuse those who must implement them and leave Mao "correct" no matter what happens. The "cultural revolution" has repeated features of past Maoist campaigns, such as setting traps and tests for his colleagues and punishing severely those who have "failed", finding scapegoats for his own errors, creating new opponents by his arbitrary behavior, and relying increasingly on revolutionary fanatics. Such irrationality has been increasingly apparent in Mao's behavior since the "hundred flowers" period in 1957, and has reached a new high in the "cultural revolution."

This Maoist stamp on developments, together with the attribution of all basic policies and changes of policy to Mao himself (in directives and "instructions" that appear genuine), argue strongly that Mao is still the central figure in the "cultural revolution." The increasingly important role and status assigned to Madame Mao also argues for the continued central position of Mao; it is most improbable that any one else would entrust such important work to a person so little qualified, and so much disliked.

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Mao's "thought," Mao's character, and Mao's practice give the situation an inherent instability. Moreover, Mao is committed to carry this revolution "to the end"--meaning not only the "destruction" of the old order but a continuing purge of the new structures he is building. And as he further disrupts his already severely disordered society, he further reduces his already narrow base of support among those capable of contributing to the constructive features.

The vacillation in Chinese policies reflects primarily Mao's own unsteadiness as a "helmsman." There have been, however, important and growing differences of disposition and inclination among Mao's lieutenants. There are those who, like Mao himself, are inclined 'left' (Lin Piao, Madame Mao, the other principal figures of the central CRG), and those who are inclined 'right' and exert a moderating influence when possible (Chou En-lai and others, including most military leaders). There has been growing tension and conflict between these groups, but the militants, being closer to Mao, have probably been in the stronger position even in periods of relative moderation.

Developments from September 1967 to the present illustrate the latter point. From September to late March, Peking's policies were mixed but on balance relatively moderate, and Mao's militant lieutenants seemed somewhat on the defensive. But in early March, when a group of military leaders offended Madame Mao and other militants, the offenders were quickly purged and a nation-wide campaign against "rightists" instituted. Since then Mao has gone out of his way to display his militant colleagues as the dominant figures on his team.

The PLA as an instrument of the revolution has suffered from Mao's style of work. It has repeatedly been given responsibility without being given either clear directives or necessary authority, and has then been chastized for "errors." It has also had to defend itself against militant "rebels" incited by Peking. Although the PLA has gained in political power, its surviving leadership has probably been left with a sense of resentment and insecurity.

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Despite the heavy casualties suffered by the PLA and the inability of any individual to protect himself, there has apparently been no broad and organized resistance movement within the PLA. That is, there has been no known effort to coordinate resistance outside Peking or to stage a coup in Peking. One reason may be that military leaders have been too conscious of Mao's mass following and historical role. Another may be that he has not taken on a large enough group of PLA leaders at any one time. Nevertheless, resentment of Mao's treatment of the PLA, combined with fear of further purges, makes the PLA an instrument of uncertain reliability. It may in fact become the instrument of Mao's overthrow.

Mao's base of support in the central leadership in Peking has narrowed sharply. The 'first team' he has recently been presenting consists of himself and Lin Biao, two actresses (Madame Mao and Madame Lin), three propagandists, three policemen, and only three or four military and government leaders. Mao's base of true supporters among military leaders seems particularly narrow, as the result of his own policies and the operations of Madame Mao.

In addition to the narrowness of Mao's base among central leaders, it seems very doubtful that the military figures who dominate the revolutionary committees throughout China are reliable "revolutionary successors." They have been put through too much. They may be too awed by or frightened of Mao to disobey him, but they have not become Maoist revolutionaries.

Mao seems to believe that his "revolution" has been a success--in purging those whom he has wished to purge, in separating the true believers from the revisionists, in creating a new governing apparatus, and in making fresh contributions to doctrine and practice. But these accomplishments are illusory. An outside observer cannot escape the conclusion that the "revolution" has been a disaster for China of at least the magnitude of the "leap forward" and the split with the Soviet camp. In previous disasters Mao has been able to protect his own position; in this case, he may be unable to.

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Whatever the prospect for Mao personally, the prospect for China is continued instability. So long as Mao dominates the leadership, he will continue to work toward fantastic goals through irrational and often conflicting policies, and he will continue to purge those who cannot work this way. The new revolutionary committees reflect Mao himself: they are inherently unstable, and conflict among their elements will continue. Moreover, in building the new party apparatus there may be a destructive conflict within the camp of the militants: the leaders of the central CRG, including Madame Mao, will probably seek to put their own followers in key party posts, while Lin Piao may want to install military leaders in these party posts concurrently.

Mao's intention to conduct further purges poses the principal danger to his own position. He may finally provoke such resentment and anxiety--particularly through Madame Mao's operations in the PLA--that an effective coalition will form against him. Apart from the possibility of his assassination by an individual with a grievance, PLA leaders might be precipitated into attempting a coup against him (and against Lin Piao too), either in Peking or on one of his tours. Mao's true supporters among PLA leaders may be so few that--like Khrushchev--he would not receive warning of such a coup.

If Mao dies or becomes disabled, and Lin succeeds, Lin will probably have to change Mao's policies or face a struggle, perhaps prolonged. A struggle would probably be waged principally between elements of the PLA and the police and mass organizations--some elements responsive to Lin and other Maoist militants, other elements responsive to Chou En-lai and certain military leaders. Lin would probably choose instead to make the necessary changes, and his successors will probably weaken Mao's doctrines still further.

THE BACKGROUND

The Madame in the First Stage of the Purge

Madame Mao became an important political figure only in late 1965, when Mao used her to plant an article in the Shanghai press attacking a playwright who was to serve as a symbol of all opposition to Mao's thought and will. The Madame, a onetime bit player in Shanghai movies, had been occupied for more than 15 years with an effort to reduce all of the Chinese arts to propaganda. Until 1965 party leaders seem to have regarded her as a simple-minded nuisance not to be taken seriously..

The planted article of November 1965 was followed quickly, however, by the seizure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) chief-of-staff Lo Jui-ching, thought to be a dangerous rival to Lin Piao. This was the beginning of the "cultural revolution," and the Madame was to rise on the wreckage of party and military leaders--including all of those who once had scorned her--until the Red Guard press could describe her as the "most outstanding commander of the great proletarian cultural revolution."

In February 1966, having decided that a purge of the PLA as well as of the party was necessary, Mao assigned the Madame to conduct a symposium on "cultural" work in the PLA. The Madame's report concluded--probably the conclusion was foregone--that there was indeed "class struggle" in the PLA and that "revolution" was essential to purify its ranks. Her report was approved in March by Lin Piao and by Chen Po-ta, a long time writer and spokesman for Mao who was to head the Cultural Revolution Group which was formed later to conduct the purge of the party. Since that time, Madame Mao has had the starring role in carrying out the purge of the PLA.

In mid-May 1966, a central committee circular confirmed that a large-scale purge of the party lay ahead, and stated expressly that Mao's opponents were in place in the PLA as well. Mac's team formed at that time the

Cultural Revolution Group to take the place of the central party apparatus and to purge that apparatus. Madame Mao, who had never had a party post, was named first deputy chairman of the CRG under Chen Po-ta.* Mao did not yet see as necessary an analogous group for the purge of the PLA.

In June and July of 1966, while Madame Mao was warming to her new role, the "cultural revolution" was being conducted by "work-teams"--small teams named by the upper levels of the party apparatus and assigned to investigate and purge lower-level bodies. The PLA contributed officers and men to these teams, and its own academies and schools were objects of the activity of these teams. The work of these teams was directed not by the newly-elevated militants such as Chen Po-ta and the Madame but rather by the conventional party apparatus under Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Liu and Teng understandably attempted to conduct the "revolution" in the party without destroying the party apparatus, but the latter was what Mao wanted to do, so the "failure" of the work-teams (as defined by Mao in late July) was the proximate cause of the downfall of Liu and Teng in early August. Several months later, Liu Chih-chien, a deputy director of the PLA's General Political Department, was made the scapegoat for the concurrent and derivative failure in the conduct of the "revolution" in the PLA in June and July.

*The Madame was the link between several leaders of the central CRG. Kang Sheng had brought Madame Mao into the party (in 1931), and the Madame had worked closely with him for many years. She had worked closely also with three important younger members of the new CRG--Chang Chun-chiao (second deputy chairman) and Yao Wen-yuan of Shanghai, two "cultural" careerists who had cooperated in writing and planting the November article which set off the "revolution," and Chi Pen-yu, a journalist whose article of April 1967 was to commence the attacks on the arch-enemy, Liu Shao-chi.

In August 1966 Lin Piao--de facto chief of the party's Military Affairs Committee, Minister of Defense, and Mao's newly-designated successor--provided a general directive for the purge of the PLA, a role he was to continue to play. He told PLA leaders that all of them would be judged on the basis of whether they demonstrated their support of Mao, gave priority to politics (over conventional military thought), and displayed revolutionary zeal. Yang Cheng-wu, who had succeeded Lo Jui-ching as chief-of-staff (acting) and as secretary-general of the MAC, was reportedly given in his MAC role the responsibility for supervising the work of the Political Department (Hsiao Hua) in carrying out a purge of the PLA on the lines of Lin's stated principles.

In late August 1966, when the newly-organized Red Guards were turned loose against the party apparatus, the PLA was told to stay out of it; in other words, the PLA was not yet an instrument of the "revolution" (although standing by as a threat). It was already an object of the "revolution," and Mao's team--now clearly including the Madame--was preparing for a stage of much greater militancy.

The Madame and the Purging Instruments

In October 1966, a MAC directive moved the "cultural revolution" in the PLA--still concentrated in the military academies and schools--into a higher gear. Mao and Lin set up at about this time a Cultural Revolution Group for the conduct of the revolution in the PLA, analogous to the central committee's Cultural Revolution Group set up five months earlier for the conduct of the "revolution" as a whole. The first nominal chief of the PLA/CRG was probably Liu Chih-chien of the General Political Department, not yet disgraced, but the de facto chief from the start was Madame Mao, its reported "advisor." The Madame thus became the only party leader to be a leader of both the central CRG and the PLA/CRG.

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At the same time (October 1966), the MAC reportedly issued another directive ordering all personnel of the PLA who encountered statements or actions contrary to Mao's thought or the MAC's policy to report these to higher levels, no matter how high the position of the offender. It was soon clear that Liu Chih-chien was not militant enough for the Madame. The Madame was making remarks subversive of Liu's work as early as November (she was to be the first party leader to make a public attack on Liu, in early January 1967), and she apparently began to go after the high-ranking and prestigious Ho Lung too at about this time.

In the same period--between October and early January--Mao and Lin were defining a second "test" that lay ahead of party leaders outside Peking. In the party's work-conference in October, and in editorials and speeches (one by Madame Mao) later, these party leaders were told that they could keep from getting purged only by denouncing Liu and Teng and their works in extreme terms, making a public self-criticism for following the "Liu/Teng line," denouncing local officials who followed that line, and meeting the demands of revolutionary mass organizations. This definition of right conduct was to prove important for an understanding of the process by which a few former regional and provincial party leaders were rehabilitated during 1967 and early 1968 and found qualified to join the "revolutionary committees."

The Madame Leading Attacks

In mid-December Madame Mao, in her role as first deputy chairman of the central CRG, exhorted the Red Guards to rise up and "take over" some government organs.*

*The Madame launched at this time what was to be a prolonged attack on the public security apparatus, regarded as still under the influence of the disgraced Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching, and on the related apparatuses of the judiciary and the procuratorate. Mao himself, some time in 1967, was to call for the entire three-part apparatus to be "smashed," i.e. reorganized completely.

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At the same time, in her role as "advisor" to the PLA/CRG, she made the first public denunciation of Ho Lung, who ranked second only to Lin Piao among officers of the MAC. (Such denunciations of leading figures by Madame Mao were to be repeated in almost every stage throughout the purge of the PLA.) Brought down with Ho in the next few weeks were several high-ranking officers of the central military leadership--including the commander of the armored forces and the political officer of the navy--and of the regional military commands, including Peking's. All seem to have been guilty--just possibly, in collusion--of resisting the militant conduct of the "revolution" in the PLA. Some were charged with conspiring against military leaders then in favor--e.g. Yang Cheng-wu and Yu Li-chin--who were themselves to be purged later; but this later reversal of fortune was not to entail any reversal of verdicts on those purged earlier.

In early January 1967 there was apparently intense questioning of the status of other military leaders by Red Guards seeking targets. Madame Mao, acting together with Chen Po-ta and Chou En-lai, told the Guards that other officers of the MAC--including Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, and Hsu Hsiang-chien--were not eligible to be targets. But the Madame again took the lead in denouncing a military leader out of favor--the luckless Liu Chih-chien, who was made the principal scapegoat for all of the "mistakes" of the PLA's Political Department in 1966. The Madame also said that Liu's PLA/CRG was to be reorganized and put under Hsu Hsiang-chien, one of the MAC officers she had defended, with Hsiao Hua and Yang Cheng-wu as his principal deputies, and with Lin Piao's wife (Yeh Chun) as a new member. The reorganized PLA/CRG was to work under the "direct leadership" of the MAC and the central CRG. (This reorganization was announced as a decision of the MAC alone, with no mention of the central CRG, implying some rivalry from the start.) The Madame at the same time adopted officially the title of "advisor" to the PLA/CRG.

Concurrently with the reorganization of the PLA/CRG, the PLA press called for a militant pursuit of the "cultural revolution" in leading organs of the PLA but

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for low-key "education" in line organizations. (This was to be under the control of party committees--not little PLA/CR groups equivalent to the miniature CRG bodies--responsive to the PLA/CRG.) This remained Mao's policy: to accept much disruption at the upper levels of the PLA from time to time, but not of the military units which might be called into action.

Curiously, within a few days of the appointment of the new PLA/CRG, several of its members (not Hsu, Hsiao or Yang) were being attacked in Red Guard posters and (reportedly) by members of the central CRG, among other things for not being responsive to Madame Mao. Perhaps the real target was Hsiao Hua. Within a week of the naming of Hsiao to the post of deputy chief of the reorganized PLA/CRG, Madame Mao and Chen Po-ta made clear that Hsiao was not in high favor. The Madame now charged Hsiao with some part of the responsibility for the rightist errors of the recently-purged Liu Chih-chien (Hsiao had in fact been Liu's supervisor), and accused him of making decisions without clearing them with Lin Piao and of being unresponsive to the central CRG. Hsiao was called on to make a sincere self-criticism. Yang Yung, the commander of the sensitive Peking military region, was immediately purged for making public an account of this meeting, but Hsiao Hua himself was given another chance.

The PLA Unleashed and Leashed Again

At this time (January 1967), the "cultural revolution" entered the stage of violent overthrow of all those in positions of authority in the party and government who were thought to be resisting Mao's new revolutionary order. The call to "seize power" soon resulted in great disorder, and it was apparent that intervention by the PLA was needed. On 23 January, the MAC, the central CRG and the State Council jointly ordered the PLA into action. The directive was put in terms of giving support to the "genuine" leftists among those contending to seize power, but the directive could be and was used to restore order without making fine distinctions.

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Soon after the PLA was ordered into action, new MAC directives modified the conduct of the "cultural revolution" in the PLA. Most importantly, these forbade the use of force, unauthorized arrests, and seizures of power, and did not repeat the earlier call for action against the bad "handful." These directives amounted to reassurances--at a time when Mao's team in Peking urgently required the cooperation of the PLA throughout China--that the purge of the PLA would not have the scope or intensity of the purge of the party.

By the end of February, the rightist trend in the conduct of the revolution was so pronounced that--as first defined by Chou En-lai in March 1967--it had become an "adverse current" or "reactionary counter-current." In Peking, the party-machine leader Tan Chen-lin allegedly tried to reopen the cases of his purged principals, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and of other purged leaders, and to discredit and destroy the central CRG. In the provinces, military leaders engaged in restoring order were necessarily acting aggressively against some of the most militant "revolutionary rebels." What was happening, apparently, was that, after a "revolutionary" group had "seized power" (meaning the seals of power, the authority of inoperative party and government organizations) and had been recognized by the local military authorities, a competing "revolutionary" group would then attempt a counter-seizure and would be suppressed by the PLA as counter-revolutionary. Some PLA leaders were later punished for their effort to prevent anarchy, and still later, other PLA leaders were brought down in part for trying to reopen the cases of these leaders, most of whom, presumably, were acting on what they took to be the intent of the directives of the time.*

*Madame Mao's understanding of Mao, and her talent for mischief-making, are illustrated by an incident of this period in which the PLA was trying hard to restore order.

[redacted] Red Guards in Canton stole a bus and drove it to Peking; Chou En-lai expressed his anger, but the Madame said the action showed the right spirit; within hours, buses were being stolen all over Canton.

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During March, Mao decided that the swing had been too far in the direction of an imposed order, and the "revolutionary rebels" were unleashed again, to attack first the "restoration" of discredited officials to posts in government organs. Chou En-lai, head of the government apparatus, defended some of the government leaders attacked for this practice but himself warned against indiscriminate rehabilitation, an issue which was to arise again in the spring of 1968.

Later in March, following an inspection tour by Lin Piao, the PLA was put back on the leash. On 30 March, Lin told the PLA that PLA units would be restricted in their use of coercion and that they were not to take action on their own initiative but were to wait for orders from above. This order--which was highly important in holding the PLA to a strict, legalistic interpretation of its mission in the months to come--was embodied in a 10-point directive of 6 April. Whereas the 23 January directive had given the PLA the upper hand over disorderly elements, the 6 April directive seemed to put the PLA at the mercy of these elements, unless local PLA leaders chose to defy Peking.

New Leadership of the PLA/CRG and the MAC

On the same day (6 April), there were intensive and apparently inspired poster attacks on Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh Chien-ying, two officers of the MAC who had probably had important roles in directing the conduct of the PLA during the February-March period of its repression of militant "rebels" and who now--with the change of line--were evidently to be made the scapegoats for that period. Both were charged with a number of rightist offenses, including opposition to Madame Mao. In mid-April posters reported (perhaps prematurely) that the Madame, supposedly only the "advisor" to the PLA/CRG, had "dismissed" Hsu as the chairman of that body--in part, for not being sufficiently responsive to her personally--and that the leadership had been given to two of Hsu's deputies, Hsiao Hua (who had evidently made a satisfactory self-

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criticism) and Yang Cheng-wu, and to Hsieh Fu-chih; Lin Piao's wife remained.*

At about this time, Hsiao (director of the General Political Department) Yang (acting chief-of-staff), Hsieh (Minister of Public Security), and Su Yu (onetime chief-of-staff, then a deputy minister of defense and most recently coordinator of defense research), were reportedly added to the standing committee of the MAC. Together with Lin Piao, these officers composed the entire group of top military leaders who were still clearly in favor. And they soon seemed to displace from the leadership of MAC the five marshals--Nieh Jung-chen (who had become second-ranking after the purge of Ho Lung but had been criticized), Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh Chien-ying (also under criticism), the inactive Liu Po-cheng, and the much-assailed Foreign Minister Chen Yi (the only one of the five reported to be actually removed from the MAC).

The PLA Under Attack

During the spring of 1967, while the PLA's military control commissions were in effect occupying China until "revolutionary committees" could be set up to replace the smashed party apparatus and the paralyzed government structure, regional, provincial and municipal PLA leaders came under increasing attack by elements of the "revolutionary rebels." The initiative for these attacks was apparently most often taken by "rebel" organizations which had been ruled against by the PLA in the early months of 1967 and which now sought a reversal of verdicts; these attacks were launched against both the PLA and the "rebel" organizations which had found favor with the PLA. Local

*The reorganization of the PLA/CRG should properly have been handled by the MAC--of which the Madame was not even a member--as it was a MAC directive which had named Hsu: another indication of possible rivalry.

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PLA leaders, forbidden since late March to take harsh action against "rebel" groups without specific orders from Peking, had perforce to protect themselves by supporting those "rebel" groups which were friendly to them. There were probably some cases too in which PLA leaders knew very well which groups were in favor with the militants (of Madame Mao's type) in Peking, but found those groups so obnoxious that they refused to support them until directly ordered to do so by Peking.* Mao himself wanted it both ways--that is, wanted both the PLA and the "rebels" to correct their errors through "rectification" programs, meeting then on a middle ground.

By mid-May the emphasis had shifted from the faults of the PLA to the faults of the "rebels," and a new directive of 6 June called for an end to a number of "rebel" offenses (e.g. assaults, destruction, looting, arrests) and gave the PLA the responsibility for enforcing the order. It did not, however, order the "rebels" to turn in the weapons they had seized, and it did not give the PLA the authority to use force against "rebel" organizations. There was simply no way for the PLA to act effectively against "anarchy" if it was forbidden to use force.

Disorder continued. Hsieh Fu-chih revealed in mid-June that there was disagreement among the leaders in Peking--probably between Madame Mao and the others of the central CRG on one hand and Chou En-lai and the central military leaders on the other--as to how to proceed. Hsieh himself was chosen to carry out the decision to



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send a small delegation to various troubled areas of China to try to put an end to the armed struggles between "rebel" groups and between those groups and the local military forces. Hsieh's lieutenants in this mission were Wang Li, a militant journalist who had been taken into the central CRG, and Yu Li-chin, the political officer of the CCAF. Both Wang and Yu were to become casualties in later stages of the "revolution."

The Wuhan Incident, Peking's Anger, New Militance

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This insubordination enraged and alarmed the leaders in Peking, notably Madame Mao. Chen Tsai-tao was quickly summoned to Peking and purged for it, and on 22 July the Madame called upon the "rebels" to arm themselves against their enemies. There was at once a great increase in seizures of weapons by the "rebels."

At the same time, in late July, the military commanders and political officers of most of the other regional commands were called to Peking. While they may have been given an opportunity there to state the genuine difficulties facing them in trying to comply with Peking's will, they were almost certainly warned in strong terms about disobedience or evasion. The point was underlined at July's end by Red Flag (controlled by officers of the central CRG), which called for the "overthrow" of the "bad

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handful" in the PLA. This withdrew the reassurances given in February that there would be no fresh wave of purges of the PLA.*

Further, in an early August speech Lin Piao, who had repeatedly shown that his allegiance was primarily to Mao rather than to the PLA, again criticized the mistakes of the PLA, and again (as in late March) told PLA leaders that in dealing with mass organizations they were not to take action of any kind without orders from Peking, no matter how long they had to wait. Lin also told the PLA to seek guidance in handling the "rebels" from the central CRG. Wall posters and the Red Guard press soon reported that the MAC had established a 'Support the Left' Group in the PLA under Hsieh Fu-chih, second-ranking of the active officers of the MAC.** The mission of this new group--probably guided by the central CRG--was almost certainly to be that of guiding the efforts of PLA commanders outside Peking in handling the revolutionary mass organizations. Subordinate 'support the left' offices, composed of PLA personnel and administratively under the jurisdiction of local military districts, were soon identified in many parts of China.

By mid-August, Hsiao Hua, the director of the PLA's General Political Department and one of the directors of the more important PLA/CRG, was finally brought down. He

*The term "handful" was not reassuring. Mao's team had used the same euphemism about the state of the party before purging about three-fourths of the leading functionaries of the party apparatus.

**Posters and the Red Guard press agree that other members of the new Group were: Hsiao Hua, as the deputy chief; Li Tien-yu, a deputy C/S and concurrently a deputy director of Hsiao's Political Department; and Cheng Wei-shan, then deputy commander, later commander, of the Peking MR. Hsiao Hua, the new deputy, was to be purged within about two weeks.

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had managed to survive the fall of several of his deputies and criticism of him by several party leaders, including Madame Mao, but this time he was through. Again Madame Mao led the attack on a discredited figure, although Lin Piao had prepared the way. Hsiao was held responsible for the deficient political consciousness of PLA leaders, as expressed in the "mistakes"--and crystallized in the Wuhan Incident--which had just been criticized by Lin. Thus Hsiao was made the scapegoat for the failure of some PLA leaders to respond as Mao wished to the confusing and often disabling orders from Peking.

At about the same time, the PLA's Cultural Revolution Group--of which Hsiao Hua had been one of the directors--was reportedly reorganized again. It came now under the control of Wu Fa-hsien, commander of the politically sound CCAF, and replaced some of its members of political officer backgrounds (and closely associated with the newly-purged Hsiao Hua) with military professionals.* So far as is known, both Yang Cheng-wu and Yu Li-chin, who were later to collide with both Madame Mao and Wu, remained members of the PLA/CRG.

Quick Repudiation of the Hard Line

The harsh and threatening line taken toward the PLA from late July soon led to a great increase in disorder, as the "rebels" were emboldened by this line. In late August, taking account of this disorder and of PLA

*The PLA/CRG continued, however, to give the same appearance as did Mao's team as a whole--that is, of an unstable association of very different types. While the reorganized PLA/CRG gave greater representation to military professionals, the extremist Madame Mao was still its real leader, and Yeh Chun--Lin Piao's wife, and a person who seemed of the same type as Madame Mao--seemed to be increasingly important, in the same roles as (though smaller parts than) Madame Mao.

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resentment, Peking began to shift the line. At first, the new line did not withdraw the criticism of the PLA, but it sharply increased criticism of the mistakes of the "rebels," and it did withdraw (reportedly on Mao's order) the late July call for a further purge of the PLA. It did this by condemning those who wished to "drag out" PLA leaders. In other words, Mao's team in Peking, alarmed in late July by the attitude of PLA leaders, was now concerned about the effects on the PLA of the line since late July and about the "rebel" violence which Peking's actions had been provoking in that period.

Mao's team apparently continued to desire a high level of "rebel" activity, but a decline in the violence. The PLA was not told to restore order at all costs. On the contrary, Liberation Army Daily informed the PLA on 30 August that it was to continue to support the Left, to support all genuine revolutionary organizations, and to bring them together rather than to suppress those which had made mistakes.

In a speech on 5 September, Madame Mao reversed and repudiated the line of late July.* She withdrew her

*Mao was on tour of the provinces, accompanied by Yang Cheng-wu (acting C/S), Yu Li-chin (political officer of the CCAF and interim commander in Wuhan after the Wuhan Incident), Chang Chun-chiao (second deputy chairman--behind Madame Mao--of the central CRG, and the top man in Shanghai), and Wang Tung-hsing (once and perhaps still chief of Mao's personal security staff, since late 1965 or so director of the general office of the CCP central committee, a post which almost certainly includes security functions, and since early 1967 reportedly head of the CRG sub-group for central party organs). Yang and Yu, like some others who had been close to Mao in earlier stages of the "cultural revolution" (e.g., Tao Chu, Ho Lung), were to be purged within a few months. Yang in particular was riding high in this period of early autumn 1967. For example, in a speech of late September he commented on the overall condition of the PLA, criticized some provincial military leaders for disobeying or distorting orders, identified some regional military leaders (footnote continued on page 15)

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call for "rebel" groups to arm themselves, warned of the danger from the "extreme 'left'" as well as from the right, defended the PLA warmly and at length, and criticized the "rebels" for attacking the PLA. On the same date, the MAC and the central CRG gave the PLA a new directive which, it seemed, could be used to suppress "rebel" groups when necessary. The directive authorized the PLA to use military force to repel attempts to seize weapons and other materiel from the PLA. If liberally interpreted, the directive could justify efforts to recover weapons and to repel physical attacks on PLA personnel and installations. As it turned out, however, the PLA in general did not interpret the directive liberally.

Better Order, the Purge of the "Ultra-Leftists"

Beginning almost immediately after the issuance of the 5 September directive and Madame Mao's speech, there was a dramatic improvement in several of the areas in which there had been serious fighting as late as the first week of September. On 18 September, the day after Liberation Army Daily reaffirmed that it was the PLA's task to assist revolutionary groups to "unite," Mao became personally associated with this course in the form of a "latest instruction." In this Mao declared that "there is no fundamental clash of interests among the working class" (i.e., revolutionary mass organizations should form alliances, not fight).

(footnote continued from page 14)

(e.g. Hsu Shih-yu in Nanking) in Mao's favor, spoke of Mao's plans for shifting regional leaders whom he thought to have been too long in one place and for shortening terms of service and simplifying study and equipment, and confirmed Mao's mismatched plans for taking guns back from "rebel" groups while at the same time arming other such groups.

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Later in September, as forecast by Madame Mao in her 5 September speech, Mao's team went further to placate the PLA. Three second-level members of the central Cultural Revolution Group (Wang Li, Kuan Feng, and Mu Hsin), and a lesser figure who was an editor of Red Flag (which had called publicly for a further purge of the PLA) were removed from their posts, charged in posters with "ultra-left" mistakes. The basic policy had of course been formulated, imposed and reaffirmed by the sacrosanct leaders, Mao and Lin Piao, but it is possible that the three second-level figures had exceeded their instructions in carrying it out. Inter alia, these figures were accused of having bonds with a "rebel" group which sought to overthrow not only Chou En-lai but such militants as Mao, Lin and Kang Sheng. While Chou En-lai and other relatively moderate leaders may have advocated the purge of these particular militants and were presumably pleased by it, party leaders credited Madame Mao with discovering the errors of the "ultra-leftists" and with taking the lead in attacking them.

The situation throughout China continued to improve through September. By National Day, 1 October, large-scale disorders were no longer being reported, although violent incidents had not ended. Both the PLA and the "rebels" had apparently been generally responsive to the new line developed since late August.

The New Team and Mao's Narrowing Base

At the same time, however, press accounts of National Day showed how Mao's base in the leadership was narrowing down to the fanatics and opportunists. The "leading comrades"--Mao's inner circle--were now reduced to the old-timers Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Li Fu-chun, and Nieh Jung-chen (not all of them fully reliable), the military and security figures who were newcomers as party leaders, Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-wu, Su Yu, and Wang Tung-hsing, and the complete newcomers of the central CRG (in addition to Chen) and of the PLA/CRG--Madame Mao, Madame Lin, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao

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Wen-yuan, and Chi Pen-yu. (Part of this already narrow base was soon to be cut away.) A few leaders who had been removed from posts and were thought to be in some degree of disfavor--at least at the time of their removal--appeared on this occasion, but not a single one of those thought to be in strong disfavor was rehabilitated and displayed.* In other words, there had been no "reversal of verdicts."

Lin Piao, giving the main speech at the National Day rally, defined the "most important" current tasks as those of (a) criticizing and repudiating party leaders already brought down (i.e., focussing on enemies rather than fighting with one another), (b) concluding and developing "alliances" among "rebel" groups (i.e., keeping order), and (c) developing the "three-way alliances" (i.e. the cooperation of the PLA, rehabilitated party cadres, and young revolutionaries in forming and operating revolutionary committees to govern China). The latter two tasks were principally the tasks of the PLA. On the same occasion, the regime's three most important journals--People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily--joined in prophesying that in carrying out its tasks in the year to come the new team would encounter challenges from both the "right" and the "extreme 'left'." This was of course a self-fulfilling prophecy.

*Among those who had lost posts and favor during the "revolution," but who now appeared in qualified favor, were the military leaders Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh Chier-ying. Some observers regarded the reappearance of the party and government leaders Li Hsueh-feng and Yu Chiu-li--out of sight for some months--as even better evidence of the increasing strength of a "moderate faction" which (they thought) was coming to dominate or already dominated the central leadership. However, both Li and Yu had been represented in early 1967 as the very models of erring officials who could be rehabilitated by repentance, confession, work and study: a few others who had run this course successfully were to be produced in the early months of 1968.

The PLA had already been hit hard by the "cultural revolution," far harder than was generally realized. Moreover, Mao at this time reaffirmed his intention to carry the revolution through "to the end." This meant that, while the PLA was to be given a respite while it restored and maintained order, it was sure to suffer a further purge. The interesting question was whether Mao, if he chose to make it another large-scale purge, would be able to get away with it--that is, whether he would not provoke resistance leading to his own overthrow.

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DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT MONTHS

Further Measures to Reduce Disorder

Another "instruction" issuing from Mao's September tour was that the process of setting up a new governing structure be speeded up. His stated intention was to establish "revolutionary committees" throughout China by early 1968, with a balance among the three elements. Local military leaders (both military commanders and political officers) and rehabilitated party and government cadres were to divide the work, and representatives from the spectrum of revolutionary mass organizations were to "super-vise" them (i.e., keep the "revolutionary" pressure on both).^{*} Military figures were evidently to be dominant in most of these committees in the early stages.

The formation of these "revolutionary committees" from below--that is, through agreements among local military leaders, party cadres, and "rebels"--had apparently not worked very well. Thus the decisions had to be made in Peking, after consultations with representatives of all three components of the "alliance." This shortcut itself took a long time, however, because the composition of the committees then had to be approved by all three components.

Throughout October, the effort to restore order was increasingly successful, although some "rebel" groups continued to be refractory. That Mao himself favored some limits on disorder was made clear by the various "instructions" and directives attributed to him; for

^{*}It appeared and still does appear that the revolutionary committees, replacing both the party and the governmental apparatus, must be responsive to all three of the key central organs--the CRG, the MAC, and the State Council, perhaps in that order of importance.

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example, he advocated "alliances" on the part of mass organizations rather than disputes for position, he said the "chief danger" was that "some people want to beat down the PLA," he insisted that there must be "no chaos" in the PLA, he described the recent "countrywide disturbance" as the "last of its kind." On the other hand, some versions of his "instructions" appearing in the "rebel" press condoned violence and disruption in certain undefined circumstances. The most militant of his lieutenants--that is, Lin Piao, Madame Mao, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng--spoke more clearly than he did in favor of restoration of order. So, of course, did Chou En-lai, who among other things warned the "rebels" not to allow themselves to be pushed by the condemnation of "ultra-left" errors into rightist errors: he expressly warned against efforts to "reverse verdicts" on disgraced rightists, a theme which was to get greater emphasis in the spring of 1968.* Hsieh Fu-chih also spoke for the restoration of order, and also, [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] gave a good account of the composition of the dominant group of leaders, among whom he did not place himself. As stated by Hsieh, the big three were Mao, Lin, and Chou En-lai, with Chou a step below the other two as their staff man, while Chen, Kang and the Madame (the three leaders of the central CRG) composed a group formed to assist the big three; these six, Hsieh said, were the holders of ultimate power, replacing the former standing committee of the politburo as the body above the politburo and the central committee. (At the same time Chou En-lai described the central CRG, considered separately, as the equivalent of the old secretariat but with greater responsibilities.) In other

*It was true, however, that there was a difference in tone between such spokesmen as Kang Sheng and Chou En-lai. Kang, like Mao, suggests a predisposition to radical and militant policies; Chou executes such policies, and well enough to protect himself, but suggests a different predisposition, and an inclination to modify such policies when he safely can.

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words, while relatively moderate policies were to be pursued for a time and relatively moderate leaders (Chou En-lai and his friends) were to have large roles in carrying them out (as often before), Mao and Lin continued to dominate the party and could change course at any time, and the group closest to them were the militants of the central CRG. Although it could be argued that Madame Mao had replaced Chou En-lai in the big three in terms of power to make or break individuals, Hsieh's assessment otherwise seemed exactly right.*

The Madame's Contribution to Fresh Disorder

In early November Madame Mao made two speeches--perhaps reinforced by unpublished speeches on the same occasion by the other militant leaders of the central CRG, Chen and Kang--which clearly contributed to the increase in disorder which followed. The Madame's speeches, as amalgamated and perhaps toned down in a subsequent article, were given to PLA representatives concerned with literature and art and to representatives of "revolutionary" groups. They were explicitly addressed to the situation in literature and art, and were concerned largely

*Shortly thereafter, acting C/S Yang Cheng-wu published an article in praise of Mao's thought and works which was denounced in March 1968 when Yang was purged. Even in retrospect it is impossible to discover how this orthodox, fulsome treatment of the subject offended against either Mao's thought or Mao's works; Yang's line ("establish absolutely" Mao's thought) was in fact the line emphasized at the time. However, Yang was later charged with having sought personal publicity by trying to get his article printed on the first page of People's Daily (reserved for one of Mao's "instructions") and by ordering the PLA to study the article. Moreover, the article, while praising Lin Piao strongly for his active defense of Mao's thought, did not mention Madame Mao's contribution to this defense; the Madame may have construed the omission as a deliberate slight.

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with the procedures for forming "three-way alliances" in accordance with the policies of the time. They were not, in general, militant. However, they included a certain amount of incendiary material which could be used by militant "revolutionary rebels" as a justification for resuming the violence and attacks on "people in authority."

This had happened before. The Madame had made a speech in late November of 1966 which was also addressed only to literature and art but which had stated clearly Mao's intention to put all party leaders who had failed him through a long process of criticism and self-criticism, and that speech was underlined as authoritative in subsequent pronouncements in party journals. Again now in 1967 the Red Guard press made much of the Madame's speech, and after some delay official media again called attention to "stagnant pools." The Madame seemed really to be expressing both aspects of Mao's "thought"--that some organizations were too disorderly, while others were too quiescent. The insistence on having it both ways was evident in Mao's own "instructions" of the time; both militant and moderate "revolutionary rebels" were soon found to be quoting selectively from these ill-composed directives to support their very different predilections.

There were probably other factors in the increasing violence after mid-November. One was the increased pressure on "revolutionary rebel" groups to compete for position in the "revolutionary committees." Another was resentment over the composition of those committees and preparatory groups already formed; those excluded, or dissatisfied with their shares, attacked those in "power" and those who had put them there, and attacks led to counter-attacks and to small wars which perpetuated themselves.*

*As a glaring instance of arrangements imposed by Peking and resented by "rebels," in early December Huang Yung-sheng, commander of the Canton MR, was named to head the preparatory group for a revolutionary committee in Kwangtung. Huang had been under attack by "rebel" groups in Canton for more than a year, had taken strong action against some of them, and had reportedly continued to (footnote continued on page 23)

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Another was the increasing evidence that rehabilitated party cadres were to play more important roles in the new committees than were the "rebels." Moreover, there were continuing indications--certainly noted by the "rebels"--of Mao's dissatisfaction with the general condition of the PLA and in particular with the PLA's handling of mass organizations. Of greatest importance, those rebel groups which did resume violence and did attack those in "authority" found that they could get away with it. They could disobey the PLA's orders with impunity because the PLA was not interpreting liberally the 5 September directive on using force to recover stolen weapons and was not taking this directive as a mandate to use all necessary force to restore order. It was not that the PLA was afraid of the "rebels," but rather than the PLA, burned twice before, was afraid of Mao, was afraid that he would once again rebuke and purge the army for harshness toward the young militants. This estimate of the situation--by both the "rebels" and the PLA--was presumably strengthened by a new "instruction" attributed to Mao in early December, which was in fact a reaffirmation of Mao's position that "rebels" who had committed "mistakes" should be helped to achieve "unity," rather than suppressed. In sum, the disinherited "rebels" thought that they had something to gain from violence, and they had good reason to believe that they would not be severely punished for engaging in violence, so it was not surprising that violence was to increase.

(footnote continued from page 22)

support their enemies even after Peking had reversed Huang's "verdict" on some of these groups. There was no reason for the "rebels" to conclude that Huang was himself imposed on Mao, that Mao was as sorry about it as they were; on the contrary, Huang, who had had commands under Lin Piao ever since the early 1930s, had made a satisfactory self-criticism and had been praised by both Mao and Lin prior to this appointment, and the appointment itself was almost certainly another mark of confidence. The continuing attacks on Huang by "rebel" groups were presumably intended to "reverse the verdict."

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Plans To Rebuild the Party Apparatus

Also in early December, following reported assertions by party spokesmen (e.g. Hsieh Fu-chih) that the party intended to convene its Ninth Congress sometime in 1968, a joint directive--of the central committee, the MAC, the central CRG, and the State Council--made clear that Mao and his team did indeed intend to rebuild the party apparatus, as in fact Mao and his spokesmen had promised from the start that they would do. This rebuilt apparatus was presumably to function either as the core of the "revolutionary committees" or as a parallel (and more powerful) structure.

Presumably, the new party apparatus would be staffed in large part by the officers of the revolutionary committees. And presumably the new apparatus would become what the old apparatus had been--the principal instrument for formulating, transmitting and carrying out the policies imposed by the small group of top leaders.*

three
militants of the central CRG had been given the task of rebuilding the party on Mao's lines: Kang Shang, to handle

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the actual reorganization (i.e., drawing up name-lists for a new politburo and secretariat, and for all other key party organs); Chang Chun-chiao, to draw up the party program; and Yao Wen-yuan, to set up the party congress. One of the most interesting questions was that of whether the PLA figures dominating most of the revolutionary committees would be transferred to the new party committees, and, if so, whether they would retain their military posts.

Disorder and Permissiveness

By the end of December, civil disorder and violence were again widespread in China, with serious disturbances reported from almost every province. The disorder was apparently not as serious as it had been a year earlier, but it seemed again to be approaching the point at which Mao and Lin--as in January 1967--would have to take serious measures against it. The Maoist methods of investigation, persuasion and education could not do the job.

At the same time (early January), the authoritative Shanghai newspapers introduced a theme which was to become of great importance during the spring. Reviewing the cases of a number of local party leaders who had been purged, the Shanghai papers said that attempts had been made to "reverse the verdict" on some of them. Those who had taken part in this effort had turned out to be "counter-revolutionaries." (The Red Guard press soon picked up this theme.)

The party and military press continued in January to tell the PLA to support "all" revolutionary mass organizations under the abiding slogan of "Support the Left," and to exhort the mass organizations to rid themselves of the various expressions of "factionalism." It was made clear that this factionalism existed also within the revolutionary committees, not simply among groups competing for posts on the committees. There was evidence too that at some points--as Yang Cheng-wu had implied in his September speech--different components of the PLA's

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regional and provincial commands were backing different groups of "rebels." It was unclear, however, whether this particular development was widespread or serious.

At the same time, there was evidence that Mao's team in Peking was failing--in at least some cases--to back the PLA leaders in the regions and provinces in using force under the terms of the 5 September directive, and, moreover, was discouraging a liberal interpretation of that directive. Whereas the directive had authorized the PLA to use force to repel attempts to seize weapons and could be used also to justify the forcible recovery of weapons, in the early weeks of 1968 there were confirmed instances in several areas--Yunnan, Szechuan, Tibet, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien--in which disorderly "rebel" groups seized arms and got away with it. In some of these cases, the local PLA commands were expressly ordered not to use force against "rebel" groups, either to recover the arms or to suppress the increasingly serious fighting which the seized arms made possible.

The Fall of One of the Madame's Proteges

This development--the failure to crack down--was itself a good indicator that Mao and Lin and the militants of the central CRG continued to dominate the leadership. The group around Chou En-lai and the central military leaders--if they had been the dominant figures--would almost certainly have authorized PLA commanders in the field to take all necessary measures to restore order.

However, at about the same time (February 1968) certain changes in the second-level leadership--three appointments and one dismissal--suggested to some observers that the relative moderates in the top leadership were now dominating it, and were imposing these changes. The appointments were of three figures of the old party apparatus who turned up in leading positions in the new "revolutionary committees" in the provinces. One of these (Li Hsueh-feng in Hopei) had been publicly

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working his way back into favor for a year, and was no surprise; but two others had been out of sight for more than a year and had been presumed purged. The probability was that these two were instances of what Mao had promised as far back as October 1966--the restoration of those party officials who could successfully pass through the long and painful process of reform and rehabilitation; subsequent Red Guard materials, quoting Mao, described one of them as exactly that. (There have thus far been very few at the upper levels, despite the assurances of Mao and Lin that "most" of the party's cadres were regarded as "good" or pretty good.) Whether such officials were genuinely reformed, had really become perfect instruments of Mao's thought and will, was of course another question.

The dismissal was of Chi Pen-yu, a militant member of the central CRG, one of the "literary adventurers" who had been pulled into the leadership in the early stages of the "cultural revolution" when Mao needed new voices to denounce the old propaganda apparatus. Several others of this lot (Wang Li, Kuan Feng, et al.) had been brought down in September 1967 for "ultra-left" mistakes--i.e. over-zealous implementation of the line imposed by the militants at the top. Chi's record had been much the same, and he might have fallen at that time if he had not had a powerful protector (to permit him to make "self-criticisms") in the person of Madame Mao. As previously noted, the Madame had worked closely with Chi for several years and had probably been his sponsor when he was brought into the central CRG in the summer of 1966. Whereas the Madame had led the attack on those purged in September, now in February, in Chi's case, she refrained from doing so. But she evidently did withdraw her support from him, and he was charged inter alia with collecting "black material" on the Madame as well as on Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Hsieh Fu-chih, and others. The central charge against Chi appears to have been that of responsibility--along with those purged in September--for the "ultra-left" policy of late summer 1967 which had mistreated and threatened the PLA. He was also charged with "ultra-left" initiatives against some of those (both moderate and militant) above him in the hierarchy. And he may have

come into conflict with Chou En-lai on the specific question of Sinkiang.* The fall of all four of the "ultra-left" second-level leaders was subsequently said to have provided a pretext for a resurgence of "rightist" activity in the early months of 1968.**

The conclusion--from the three appointments and Chi's dismissal--that the moderates were now dominating the leadership was pretty clearly too strong. However, there may have been a temporary dilution of the power of

*The situation in the province ("autonomous area") of Sinkiang continued to be baffling. Wang En-mao, the party first secretary and military commander in Sinkiang, had been hit hard by the Red Guards in an early stage of the "cultural revolution" and had seemed out of favor with Mao's team; in fact, Mao himself had reportedly criticized him. Yet Wang remained in place, and for much of 1967 was in Peking, where Mao could presumably have purged him if he chose. Wang was back in his provincial capital by October 1967 and then dropped out of the news, but Red Guard materials reported him to be under attack again in early 1968 by one of his subordinates there and by Red Guard groups apparently responsive to that official; they reported him also to be "dragged" to Peking at this time and kept there (he appeared in Peking on May Day). The Sinkiang question may yet affect the fortunes of many leaders in addition to Chi Pen-yu.

**By the end of February, the level of violence throughout China was in general reported to be dropping. This was presumably a payoff from the campaign against factionalism and may also have been due to increasing indications from Peking that regional and provincial military leaders who had long been objects of "rebel" criticism and attack were in fact in favor with the militant leaders in Peking, including Mao and Lin. One of them was soon to be named as the new chief-of-staff and as secretary-general of the MAC.

one of the worst of the militants--Madame Mao herself. This conjecture derives from the establishment of new political work groups in the PLA.

The New Political Work Groups

At about this time--February 1968--Mao's team set up in the PLA three separate but related groups to carry on the work of political control and surveillance once performed by the General Political Department (sent to purgatory after the fall of its director--Hsiao Hua--in August 1967). The new groups were designed either to supplement or to replace the PLA/CRG as the body concerned with the political reliability of high-ranking military officers.

The three groups were called the political work group, the literary and art group, and the military press (chun pao) group. At a reception for members of these groups (reported in the Red Guard press in early March), Lin Piao and Yang Cheng-wu defined the work of the groups. Their work was to be "political"--saturating the PLA with Mao's thought--and "organizational," that is, learning more about the PLA's leaders from the army level up, to support a judgment as to their political reliability. Lin complained that, owing to Hsiao Hua's poor performance, the top leaders did not know whom they could rely on. Lin told these groups that they would get instructions from, and would report to, Chairman Mao, the central committee, Premier Chou, the central CRG, and the "administrative unit" of the MAC; as reported, Lin did not mention the PLA/CRG, the organ which, one would think, would be the logical choice to supervise these new groups directly if the PLA/CRG were to continue to function. In fact, Lin told them, they were to be supervised by officers of the MAC and the central CRG.

The political work group--clearly the most important, in that it would normally be dealing with officers of higher rank and in command of combat forces--was to be supervised by the "administrative unit" of the MAC.

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The chief of this office was not identified, but it may have been Yang Cheng-wu, as it was Yang who was secretary-general of the MAC and who provided the discussion of the work of this group. (The head of the group itself may have been Wu Fa-hsien, particularly if the PLA/CRG was disbanded at that time.) The literary and art group was to be supervised primarily by Madame Mao, and the military press group by Chen Po-ta and Yao Wen-yuan.

Although the new political work group may have been designed simply to feed information to the PLA/CRG, subsequent developments were to give some support to the conjecture that the new group was intended to replace the PLA/CRG.

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although the evidence is thin, it may be that Madame Mao's power was diluted by the establishment of this new group, and it may further be that Yang Cheng-wu was named the supervisor of the group (analogous to the Madame's role as "advisor" to the PLA/CRG) and that the Madame saw Yang Cheng-wu as a threat to her position as the principal person reporting to Mao and Lin Piao on the political character of their PLA leaders.* (It will be recalled that Yang had played this role once before--in autumn 1966--just prior to the time that Madame Mao took over leadership of the PLA/CRG.) If so, the purge of Yang Cheng-wu a few weeks later is easier to understand.

*The speeches at this reception in fact show a minor clash between Yang and the Madame at the time. Yang implied that the political work group was too small for its many tasks, and the Madame immediately countered --snidely--that a few men were enough, if their leaders were good. The Madame may have had an interest in restricting the size (and authority) of the group.

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The Purge of Yang Cheng-wu and Others

By early March there was evidence that the PLA was acting aggressively in running the "revolutionary committees" throughout China. While the local PLA leaders remained responsible to the MAC, the CRG and the State Council for their actions, military men dominated most of these committees, and, in the absence of explicit orders from Peking, could act high-handedly--contrary to Mao's longstanding proposition that the party must command the gun, and to his recently-reaffirmed intention to rebuild the party apparatus and make it his principal instrument again. Both the PLA press and the party press for some weeks had been reminding the PLA of its duty to treat cadres--as well as representatives of the revolutionary left--"correctly," and had been calling for "emancipating the great majority" of cadres, encouraging them to "step forward," "boldly using" them, allowing them to play their "core and key" role, and so on. (The press had also added this element to its running attacks on "anarchism" and "factionalism" on the part of revolutionary mass organizations.)

On 7 March Mao, Lin, and seven other top leaders (including Madame Mao) received delegates to various conferences of activists in the study of Mao's works. More than 40 second-level leaders concerned with military affairs appeared on this occasion, and it was to be the last appearance for some of them, because on that same night three of the central military leaders were so careless or unlucky as to give Madame Mao cause to purge them. This group was broken at once, and other military leaders remained out of the news while--presumably--their cases were being examined.

The first three victims of this latest wave of the purge were all high-ranking military officers who had risen in the course of the "revolution" as their predecessors had been purged or transferred, and who were now to be

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brought down themselves as "rightists."* They were Yang Cheng-wu, acting chief-of-staff since late 1965 and ranking below only Lin Piao and Hsieh Fu-chih among active military leaders; Yu Li-chin, first political officer of the CCAF; and Fu Chung-pi, commander of the Peking Garrison. Two of the three, Yang and Yu, had been members of the PLA/CRG under Madame Mao and Wu Fa-hsien; Yang may have been named a few weeks earlier to supervise the political work group of the MAC which was to supplement or replace the PLA/CRG and which Wu Fa-hsien may have

*It does not seem very useful to try, as some observers have tried, to separate the Chinese military leaders into "radical" and "moderate" figures. Except for Lin Piao (who seems to have identified completely with Mao Tse-tung) and a handful of young opportunists, almost all of the Chinese military leaders should probably be regarded as relative moderates, when compared with the doctrinaire militants like the officers of the central CRG. The nature of their work predisposes them to dislike and resent disruptive political adventures like the "cultural revolution," while at the same time predisposing them to try to carry out orders. The great majority of Chinese military leaders, like the government leaders around Chou En-lai, are seen as having a common interest in opposing the excesses of the "revolution" (and in fact in every known case in the course of the "revolution" the purged military officers have been charged primarily with "rightist" offenses) but as cautious in expressing that opposition (as witness the fate of those who had been incautious). A small number of PLA leaders are seen as psychologically divided--identified with the PLA on one hand, with long-standing ties to other military leaders, and thus unsympathetic to "revolution" as conceived by its most militant leaders, but placed in a very difficult position by being given posts which have forced them to conduct the purge of the PLA or to carry out exercises which harass the PLA and impede its work (those in the Political Department, the PLA/CRG, the political work groups, and the 'Support the Left' group).

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headed, and Yu may also have been named to that new group; Yang had also been closely associated with Hsieh Fu-chih in the MAC; Yu had of course worked closely with Wu Fa-hsien in the CCAF and had been a member of Hsieh Fu-chih's touring group in summer 1967; and Fu had been an officer of the Peking revolutionary committee which Hsieh headed.

The various accounts of the purge of the three fail, as is usually the case, to give a satisfactory picture. All that is clear about this case is that the three ran directly afoul of Madame Mao. [redacted] "rebel" newspapers--both centering on a long speech by Lin Piao at a 25 March meeting--give the impression that Yang and Yu were purged primarily for having questioned the judgment of Mao, Lin Piao and Madame Mao and for having tried to do something about it, and that Fu was purged mainly as a catspaw of the other two. The treatment of the case at the 25 March meeting--by such leaders as Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, and Kang Sheng, as well as by the Madame herself--emphasizes the outrage to Madame Mao personally.

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The materials suggest that the relations of Yang and Yu with the Madame, Hsieh and Wu--especially with the Madame--had been deteriorating for some time. The two had not been openly opponents of the three, in the way that Peng Te-huai had openly opposed Mao; indeed, they were said to be "double-dealers," who pretended to support the decisions of the leaders but really did not, and said disrespectful things and then denied it. Both Yang and Yu had apparently drawn attention to themselves by advocating, or being taken as advocating, a review of the cases of some of the party and military leaders purged earlier. Thus they are charged with having "dared to witness for the adverse current" which Tan Chen-lin had allegedly initiated a year earlier--which sought a "reversal of verdicts"--and thus with having "slandered" Mao, Lin, the central CRG, and Madame Mao.

If this is indeed what happened, it could have come about through the operations of the MAC's new political work group--as the new group began to compile materials to support a judgment as to the political

reliability of PLA leaders. The judgment might easily have been reached by intelligent and honest men (and Yu at least had seemed to be an unusually intelligent and able man) that poor decisions had been made, and this judgment is clearly attributed to them in the charges. Moreover, if the same criteria were to be used, then a number of other military leaders still in favor were equally qualified to be objects of the purge; and this judgment is implicitly attributed to them in the additional charges that they "conspired to oppose" Hsieh and Wu and that they planned to "overthrow" those two leaders and several regional military commanders. Beyond this, the very operations of the new group--particularly if it was designed to replace or had already replaced the PLA/CRG--could be seen by Madame Mao as a threat to her personal position, and Yang and Yu are in fact charged with seeking to build "personal political power." Any group of leaders attempting to direct any organization would of course be vulnerable to charges of empire-building, and most of those purged during the "revolution" have had this charge included in the list; but the leaders of the political work group may have been particularly vulnerable, as Lin Piao and Chou En-lai in their remarks to the group had warned expressly against repeating this particular mistake of the General Political Department.* (There

*It should be recognized that the evidence is not strong for the proposition that Yang Cheng-wu was the de facto supervisor of the political work group. It consists largely of his role as secretary-general of the MAC and of his role in the reception for the new groups.

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are additional charges relating to self-publicity, disputes in the Peking revolutionary committee, and the handling of mass organizations.)

Any expression of the feeling attributed to them --that some poor or questionable decisions had been made in the course of the "revolution"--could indeed be taken as reflecting unfavorably on Mao and Lin, and would certainly be taken by the Madame (who has displayed a vanity of the same pathological order as Mao's own) as reflecting unfavorably on herself. She would have then both a means and a motive for "settling accounts," in addition to the possible motive of wishing to strangle the new political work group or to get her own men into the leadership of it. On the night of 7-8 March she got her chance.

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[redacted] the "rebel" press agree that Yang sent Fu Chung-pi, the garrison commander, to the premises of the central CRG to "arrest people" there. These unidentified "people" may have been simply visitors --perhaps some of the Madame's favorite Red Guard groups-- but Lin's speech suggests that they may have been low-level staff members who had helped to prepare charges against persons in favor with Yang and Yu. It is not clear whether Yang was acting under any kind of order from above, or in which of his posts (perhaps as supervisor of the political work group); nor is it clear whether he was giving fresh offense to Hsieh (Minister of Security) by sending the garrison commander. It seems clear, however, that Yang did not obtain permission in advance from the leaders of the central CRG--Chen Po-ta, the Madame, and Kang Sheng--and Madame Mao is given credit for personally and "bravely" preventing Fu from making the arrests.

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The probability is that Yang, Yu, and Fu were all placed under house arrest at once, although they seem to have been given an opportunity to defend themselves before sentence was passed on 22 March. Their case was publicized to the PLA on 25 March.

A New Offensive Against the "Rightists"

Party leaders--including Madame Mao--began at once to prepare a new offensive against the "rightists." On 11 March, Madame Mao, Madame Lin, and Chou En-lai, speaking to students and teachers in Peking, denounced the "adverse current" of early 1967 and warned of the danger of a new "adverse current." On 15 March, Madame Mao and some others (again including Chou) met in Peking with a delegation from Szechuan, and the Madame defined the "rightist" effort to "reverse verdicts" as the current "main danger" all over China. On this occasion, the Madame and others rebuked Chang Kuo-hua and Liang Hsing-chu--the leaders of the Chengtu MR and of the preparatory group, who had been installed after a series of military leaders of that regional headquarters had fallen--for having failed to give proper support to militant leaders and militant revolutionary mass organizations there, including a deputy political officer of the MR who had a better understanding of the true leftists.* (The Madame reportedly told them that, contrary to what they might believe--what any PLA officer might reasonably believe--

*The Madame showed an interest in the rehabilitation of a member of the former party apparatus in the Southwest, Li Ta-chang, an old friend, who had gone through the process of self-criticism and denunciation of his former associates which entitled one to be considered repentant and purified--the very process which the Madame in a November 1966 speech had publicly stated to be necessary. Li duly appeared as an officer of the new revolutionary committee in Szechuan in late May.

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she was not hostile to the PLA; and she also told them that the PLA should have more "woman generals.")

On the next day (16 March), Liberation Daily in Shanghai--long a favorite vehicle of the militant leaders of the "cultural revolution" and controlled directly by two members of the central CRG--opened the public attack on those who wished to "reverse the verdicts on the rightists." On 18 March, Madame Mao and Chen Po-ta spoke of the current danger to a delegation from Chekiang. On 20 March, in Shanghai, the disgraced Chen Pei-hsien was dragged out again as an example. On 21 March, the Madame, Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng spoke on the same lines--the current threat from the right--to a group from Kiangsu. On this occasion, the Madame followed the practice of Mao himself by explaining that the "bad elements" of the central CRG (notably the "ultra-leftists") had been placed there by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. At the same gathering, Kang Sheng increased the gravity of the charges against Liu and others by declaring them to be agents of the Kuomintang (and thus eligible for execution). On 22 March, there was a large-scale demonstration in Peking against Tan Chen-lin, the alleged central figure of the first "adverse current." On 24 March, Madame Mao and Kang Sheng spoke to PLA representatives about the past and present threat posted by people like Tan Chen-lin. At about the same time, public denunciation of the three disgraced in the 7-8 March incident--Yang, Yu, and Fu--began with poster attacks on these "big ambitious rightists" and conspirators.

The Madame, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai

Lin Piao, in the presence of Mao and Madame Mao and a few other party and military leaders, informed the lower levels of the PLA on 25 March of the disposition

of the cases of Yang, Yu, and Fu.* He also announced the appointment (by Mao) of Huang Yung-sheng--then commander of the Canton MR--to replace Yang as chief-of-staff or acting C/S, and of Wen Yu-cheng, Huang's former deputy in Canton and more recently a deputy C/S, to replace Fu as commander of the Peking Garrison. (The revised team of military leaders--Lin, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang, and Wu Fa-hsien, in that order--appeared publicly the same evening.**

**Some observers--not most--have treated Huang as a military leader more "closely aligned" with moderate forces than was Yang Cheng-wu, and thus as a new C/S whom the militants in the Chinese leadership were "forced to accept." But Huang seemed a "moderate," or an ally of the moderates, in exactly the same sense that Yang and other military professionals had seemed to be: one predisposed against a militant and disruptive conduct of the "revolution," but cautious about resisting it. Moreover, Huang, like Yang before him, had served since the 1930s in Lin Piao's commands, had been praised by Mao and Lin, and, like Yang, had almost certainly been chosen for the post not by any group of "moderates" but by Mao and Lin. This is not to say that Huang will not disappoint their expectations, as Yang did; as the "revolution" proceeds, Huang too may find a point at which he feels he must take certain risks to resist it, if the PLA is not to be ruined.

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
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More Defense, More Offense

The recent challenge to Madame Mao (and the central CRG as a whole) was again emphasized, and extreme deference to the Madame was again shown by other leaders, at a rally on 27 March and a reception on 30 March. As the principal speaker at the rally of 100,000, Madame Mao defended the course of the "revolution" and all of the adverse decisions on individual leaders that had been made, described the efforts of the recently-purged military leaders to discredit the central CRG, and took note that some people wanted to "fry me in oil"; her pauses were filled by "shouts" by Hsieh Fu-chih, Yeh Chun (Madame

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Lin Piao) and Chen Po-ta, endorsing her analysis, praising her conduct, denouncing her opponents, and calling upon everyone to "learn" from her, "support" her, carry out her "directives," and defend her (and the central CRG) "until death." The same deference to the Madame was shown in the speeches of other top-level leaders--Kang Sheng, Chen Po-ta, and Chou En-lai--on this occasion. Chou's speech in particular was remarkable, as Lin Piao's 25 March speech had been, for a prolonged tribute to Madame Mao, in which he stated expressly that the principal party and military leaders who had been purged in the "revolution" had (among other offenses) persecuted and opposed the Madame personally, and went on to imply (as had seemed to be the case) that the Madame had had the principal role in the central CRG in judging whether individual leaders met or did not meet Mao's standards (and thus in marking those to be purged).*

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Immediately after the 25 March meeting, the public campaign against the new rightists--against the "rightist resurgence" and the efforts to "reverse verdicts"--began to spread across the nation. The Honan Daily began it on 26 March with an editorial forthrightly entitled "Resolutely Repulse the Counter-Revolutionary Black Wind

*In her own interjections, Madame Mao called for the defense of Mao and Lin, and praised Chou.

of Reversing Verdicts on the February Adverse Current." The authoritative Shanghai press soon followed, and in the next few weeks authoritative newspapers in most of the provinces and major municipalities were to carry editorials denouncing "right deviation" and "right splittism" in general and the effort to "reverse the previous correct decisions" on rightists in particular, and to report rallies to the same end at which previously-disgraced officials were again produced.

The press followed the lead of party leaders in working a defense of Madame Mao into the campaign against the "rightists." For example, an editorial of 7 April in Peking Daily--recognized as authoritative and reprinted--described Lin Piao and the Madame as both being Mao's "close comrades-in-arms", and went on to praise her for being "most resolute and courageous" and for having made "outstanding contributions." The Wen Hui Pao (Shanghai) reprinted this under a banner of "pledging our lives" to defend Mao, Lin, the central committee, the central CPG, and Madame Mao.

"Proletarian Factionalism" and Other Bad Omens

Beginning on 10 April, there was an important change in the definition of "factionalism." Whereas "factionalism" for the first three months of 1968 had meant factionalism--that is, self-seeking and disorderly behavior by mass organizations which were supposed to form alliances--and was a bad thing, it now turned out that there was a good factionalism and a bad factionalism. Writing jointly on the inauguration of the revolutionary committee in Hunan (Mao's place of origin), People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily reminded the national audience that the cultural revolution was a class struggle, and went on to argue that bourgeois factionalism must be opposed. Subsequent editorials were to make the point explicit that proletarian factionalism was a good thing and indeed necessary to combat bourgeois factionalism.

On 12 April, the Tsinan Radio, which had been carrying on for several days about "counter-revolutionary double-dealers" (like the Yang Cheng-wu group) in the Shantung provincial committee, announced the purge of three members of its standing committee (the second-level of leadership)--apparently for a mixture of "rightist" and "ultra-leftist" offenses. It was alleged that in collusion with "counter-revolutionary double-dealers at a higher level" (presumably Yang's group), the three had conspired against the top leaders of the committee (one a party figure, one military). The one known military officer of the three (a deputy C/S of the provincial MD) was described as having taken the initiative in the conspiracy. There was no independent evidence of a special relationship between Yang Cheng-wu's group and any of the three, but the event had unpleasant implications for other national, regional and provincial military leaders.

Within a few days, there was evidence that militant "rebel" groups in several areas had been freshly stimulated by the attacks on "rightist" military leaders since late March. Posters appearing in Peking and perhaps elsewhere attacked Chen Hsi-lien, commander of the Shenyang (Northeast) MR, and Sung Jen-chiung, former political officer of that MR (and longtime protege of the disgraced Teng Hsiao-ping), for having ordered or at least permitted armed attacks (using tanks and machine-guns) on "rebels" in Shenyang in early April. These leaders had reportedly been given a vote of confidence by Chou En-lai himself in late March, and both the fresh activity of the militant "rebels" in early April (apparently provoking military counter-action) and the fresh poster attacks on the military leaders suggested a belief--or hope--that the situation had changed. Further, posters reported large-scale violence in Shansi as a result of clashes between the civilian head of the revolutionary committee there and the political officer of the provincial MD. There were concurrent reports of heavy casualties in renewed fighting in Shensi, Szechuan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Hunan.

For the rest of April, the tone and content of both the central and the provincial press--on the matters of both the threat from the rightists and the virtue of proletarian factionalism--continued to be harsh and militant. Some of the commentaries--both central and provincial--joined the two themes, arguing that the rightists could be countered by the good factionalists.

On 20 April, developing the theme they had introduced on 10 April, People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily wrote jointly on the "need to apply class analysis to factionalism." This editorial strongly encouraged the expression of "proletarian revolutionary factionalism," and concluded that one must "never discard a revolutionary principle merely for the sake of achieving an outward appearance of peace and harmony," and that one must "struggle" for unity and not "compromise" for it--thus in effect reversing the line taken in February and March. The Shanghai press followed at once, going so far as to warn against "forgetting class struggle and occupying ourselves with inane discussion of a struggle to oppose factionalism"--a pejorative description of the previous line. The provincial press soon followed, while continuing its campaign against the rightist threat, and, as noted above, sometimes related the two themes.

In commenting on the rightist (or "ultra-leftist" objectively rightist) threat, in particular the effort to "reverse correct verdicts" on the rightists, several of the provincial journals not only denounced previously-disgraced officials for this and reported the "dragging-out" of some of them, but stated or implied that this threat was a current concern to the local authorities. Further, they implied that some of the local authorities themselves would be purged; it was said, for example, that persons still in office were protecting dangerous rightists removed from office but still dangerous. And in commenting on factionalism, several of the provincial journals indicated not only that the local authorities would take harsh action against "rebel" groups judged to be conservative, but that there was fresh fighting among "rebel" groups and new attacks on the local authorities themselves by "rebel" groups.*

The First Team: Domination by the Militants

On May Day, Mao's team offered a show of both aspects of its position--that is, a collage of moderate and militant features, with the militant in the brighter colors. The joint editorial of the three principal journals--People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily--on one hand reaffirmed that the team was making its way between the perils of the right and of the ultra-left, that it favored alliances, that there were "extremely few bad elements," and that the PLA had done a great job and must be cherished; and on the other hand that the class struggle was intensifying as the "revolution" proceeded (a Stalinist line), that all "hidden renegades"

*In this connection, there was in late April an eyewitness report of battles (although apparently without heavy weapons, and with little blood spilled), among "hundreds" of students at Peita (Peking University), making it virtually certain that there were renewed outbreaks of violence at many other points.

must be discovered, that all expressions of rightism (in particular, the effort to "reverse correct decisions") must be opposed and smashed, and that proletarian factionalism was a good thing. In other words, the team was reaffirming both the relatively moderate policies in effect from September to late March, and the militant initiatives taken since late March--both genuine features of Mao's tangled and contradictory "thought," but with the militant showing as closer to Mao's heart.

The same impression was given by the display of leaders on May Day. The team put on display all of the central leaders not known to be in outright disgrace. That is, it included a number of party and military leaders known or believed to be in some degree of disfavor, including some who had been out of the news since early March, the time of Yang Cheng-wu's collision with the central CRG. (Some of these were even on the rostrum with Mao and Lin.) Thus Peking was indicating that it had not yet found, or was not yet choosing to point out, any "black backer" of Yang's group, as all of the leaders of his level or above were present. But at the same time the line-up of leaders on the rostrum showed strikingly the importance of the militants who had risen in and on the "cultural revolution" and of the special instruments of the "revolution" which they dominated.

On the rostrum with Mao, Lin and Chou (and a few survivors from the old politburo) were the top five officers of the central CRG (including the Madame, ranked ninth among all leaders present but seventh among active leaders) and the five or six principal officers of the old PLA/CRG (including Yeh Chun, Lin Piao's wife, ranked twentieth among active leaders and now second among officers of the PLA/CRG), now possibly reassigned to the central CRG and the MAC's political work groups. The military was well represented: most of the active officers of the MAC were on the rostrum, and all were present; almost all of the surviving leaders of the Ministry of National Defense and of the central departments and service headquarters were present; more than half of the commanders of military regions were present; and there were many other regional and provincial military leaders.

(Representation was disproportionately heavy from areas without revolutionary committees and with an abnormally high degree of disorder, such as Szechuan, Tibet, Sinkiang and Fukien, suggesting that these officers were in Peking in part for consultations on the formation of such committees and related problems.)

The same balance--that is, imbalance, favoring the militants--appeared in the poster accounts of the fortunes of individual leaders which were observed at that time or appeared immediately after May Day. On one hand, a "huge" poster was seen which carried a self-criticism by Chen Po-ta, head of the central CRG, reportedly emphasizing his responsibility for favoring Chi Pen-yu before the latter's fall in February (this was doubly interesting, because it had apparently been Madame Mao, not Chen, who was principally responsible for Chi's rise); however, Chen's self-criticism was in the same self-serving form as Mao's own "self-criticism" in October 1966 for having trusted Liu and Teng, it included a claim that he had corrected his errors, and this claim was endorsed in the poster by Hsieh Fu-chih, who described Chen as one of Mao's faithful soldiers (also doubly interesting, in that Chen was thus cleared by someone well below him in the hierarchy). On the other hand, there were fresh poster attacks--unaccompanied by any defense--on Chen Yi (once an officer of the MAC) and strong poster attacks--with a notice of a coming mass meeting--on Nieh Jung-chen (who has been more important as the coordinator of China's civilian scientific/technological programs than as an officer of the MAC). With the late March poster attacks on Yeh Chien-ying, this brought under attack three of those four marshals of the MAC as of early 1967 who had apparently been held responsible for the PLA's unsatisfactory performance during the "adverse current" (the rightist resurgence) of early 1967, but who had seemed to make a partial comeback since that time; presumably the new wave of concern about a rightist resurgence was responsible for the fresh attacks. The attacks were also interesting in bringing to five--those three, plus Li Fu-chun, and Yu Chiu-li--the number of close associates of Chou En-lai publicly attacked since late March. Chou was, of course, the principal administrator of the policies

of the relatively moderate period from September to late March, and was generally regarded as the leader (in some sense) of those with a common interest in modifying or deflecting policies associated with the militants. It thus continued to appear, in early May, that a further purge of military leaders and moderate figures lay ahead, although there was not sufficient reason to conclude that the next wave of the purge would be a large one.

There was an even more striking display of the militants, and of the degree to which Mao's team had become a family affair, at an 8 May reception for components of the revolutionary committees. In the official account, the officers of the central CRG, the old PLA/CRG (now perhaps reassigned), and the 'Support the Left' Group were grouped with Mao and Lin, although most of them are not politburo members, and most of the politburo members were dropped out of the elite group and listed separately below. The account seemed clearly to be making the point that the 14 figures in the Mao-Lin grouping were to be taken as Mao's first team, his "proletarian headquarters." After Mao, Lin, and Chou En-lai came Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng of the central CRG, then Li Fu-chun* (the same order for the first six as on 1 October), then Madame Mao, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan of the central CRG (with the Madame concurrently on the old PLA/CRG), then Hsieh Fu-chih and Huang Yung-sheng of the MAC and 'Support the Left' and perhaps the political work group, then Wu Fa-hsien and Yeh Chun of the old PLA/CRG (Yeh Chun now officially second) and perhaps the political work group, and finally Wang Tung-hsing of the central CRG and the security services. In other words, Mao's first team consisted of himself and Lin, their wives, the party police chief (Kang), two military leaders in addition to Lin (Huang and Wu), three

*Li seemed the only incongruous figure--that is, the only one believed not to be highly active in promoting the "revolution" and not regarded by Mao as fully reliable.

propagandists, two government leaders (Chou and Li) and two more policemen (Hsieh and Wang). There is no way to make this list come out as predominately moderate.*

The same group (less Chang Chun-chiao, absent in Shanghai) was again displayed on 20 May as the first team. Essentially the same group was displayed again in early June, but this time with the odd man--Li Fu-chun--excluded and listed below.

The Scale of the Purge

It remains true that the scale of the purges of the PLA leadership--from the very top level to the level of provincial commanders--is not generally recognized. The purge of the PLA has not been on the same scale as the purge of the party, has normally struck only a few officers at a time, and has been less publicized, but cumulatively it has been formidable. A brief review follows.

As for the principal guiding body, the Military Affairs Committee (MAC), Chairman Mao and de facto Chairman Lin Piao have remained in place, but, of the other seven known officers when the "revolution" began, one was purged at once (Lo Jui-ching), another by the end of

*Shortly thereafter, on 16 May, the three central journals--People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily--published a joint editorial on the second anniversary of the central committee circular which "formally" launched the cultural revolution. It was appropriately militant, denouncing several discredited party leaders by name as "renegades" and enemy agents, reaffirming Mao's policy of "putting destruction first," pointing again to the dangers of the "right-deviationist trend of trying to reverse correct decisions," and calling for a continuation of "attacks on the class enemy."

1966 (Ho Lung), another was soon dropped (Chen Yi), and the remaining four (Nieh Jung-chen, Liu Po-cheng, Hsu Hsiang-chien, and Yeh Chien-ying) were displaced as active leaders by the four rising figures added in early 1967, although so far as is known the four marshals are still members of the MAC standing committee. Moreover, two of the four added in 1967 (Hsiao Hua and Yang Cheng-wu) have since been purged. The effective leadership seems to amount to Lin Piao, Hsieh Fu-chih, Su Yu, and the recently-added Huang Yung-sheng; Wu Fa-hsien is an unreported but possible fifth.

The PLA's Cultural Revolution Group, the special organ formed to conduct the purge, has suffered the normal fate of purging instruments--to be purged itself with every shift in the line. Of its four chairmen in its short life, in 1967 two were purged (Liu Chih-chien and Hsiao Hua) and a third (Hsu Hsiang-chien) was removed and demoted, and of its other eight known officers five have been purged (Yang Cheng-wu, Hsu Li-ching, Kuan Feng, Hsieh Tang-chung, Li Man-tsun). The only surviving officers--if the group itself has survived--have been Madame Mao, "advisor" and de facto chief, Wu Fa-hsien (chairman since August 1967), Wang Hsin-ting and Chiu Hui-tso; Yeh Chun (Madame Lin Piao) has obviously moved from lowly member to rank behind Wu Fa-hsien in this group or its successor, and others (e.g., Li Tso-peng, Chang Hsiu-chuan, Liu Hsien-chuan) may have been added to the officers. However, as noted, the PLA/CRG may have been disbanded in February and its officers reassigned to the central CRG and the MAC's political work groups.

As for the foremost conventional military organ, the Ministry of National Defense, Minister Lin Piao has prospered, but, of the other eight ranking officers when the "revolution" began, three deputy ministers and the head of the general office were purged by early 1967 (Lo Jui-ching, Hsu Kuang-ta, Liao Han-sheng, and Hsiao Hsiang-jung). Since that time, the Ministry's leadership has apparently been stable--Lin, Hsiao Ching-kuang, Su Yu, Wang Shu-sheng, and Hsu Shih-yu; but others may have been added.

The General Staff (which coordinates combat operations) lost two chiefs-of-staff to the purge (first Lo Jui-ching, then Yang Cheng-wu), and of the other ten principal officers when the "revolution" began at least five have been purged (deputies Chang Ai-ping, Peng Shao-hui, and Yang Yung, and operational directors Wang Shang-jung and Lei Ying-fu) and another deputy has long been missing (Chang Tsung-hsun). The effective officers are the new chief-of-staff, Huang Yung-sheng; the new deputies Wu Fa-hsien and Wen Yu-cheng, and (apparently) the old deputies Li Tien-yu, Wang Shu-sheng, Wang Hsin-ting, and Han Hsien-chu.

The General Political Department, as an organ responsible for political control and surveillance, has been wiped out, although the department nominally exists. Its director (Hsiao Hua) and at least two of its deputy directors (Liang Pi-yeh and Liu Chih-chien) are known to have been purged, two others (Fu Chung and Hsu Li-ching) have apparently been purged, another (Yuan Tzu-chin) has long been missing, and only one (Li Tien-yu) has appeared in favor (and not in this post).


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Of the 13 principal figures of the seven principal service headquarters* as of late 1965--the commanders and political officers, with one dual--six are known or believed to have been purged. Of the Air Force, commander

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In sum, of the 65 top positions in the central military leadership, the occupants of at least 35 of these positions--at least 28 individuals--are known or believed to have been purged, and several others have been displaced as active leaders. Half of the 28 purged officers of the central leadership were military professionals, and half were political specialists.


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Many of the regional and provincial military leaders who have survived were exposed to the kind of "rebel" attacks which had preceded the downfall of political figures. It is not known whether these attacks reflect an intention on the part of the militant leaders in Peking to bring down these regional and provincial figures at a later date. Some observers believe that Mao's team in Peking has already tried and failed to bring down these military leaders outside Peking,

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CONCLUSIONS

Mao's Domination

The first and fundamental conclusion is that Mao Tse-tung has been the central figure in, and the source of basic policies for, the "cultural revolution"--the man in charge, if not always in control of events. At the heart of the revolution is Mao's conviction of the absolute correctness of his "thought," central to which is his belief in the power of the fanatical revolutionary will, and Mao's obsessive concern with developing "revolutionary successors" who will be vehicles of that will and faithful to that "thought." The "revolution" has exhibited throughout such features of Mao's character as his boundless vanity, his increasingly paranoid suspicion, and his vindictiveness.

In conducting the "revolution" Mao has exhibited certain unstable and irrational practices which, particularly since 1957, have come to pervade his style of leadership. He constructs fantasies and insists that others act as if these were the real world. He establishes as policy contradictory aspects of his "thought" without explaining how the contradictions are to be reconciled, and he issues equivocal directives which permit him to shift at will without admitting a reversal of course. He defines his own position (when decisions must be made) automatically as the true center between the errors of the "right" and the "extreme 'left,'" and, when these practices and policies lead to disaster, insists that his great losses have really been gains. The purge throughout has also exhibited, on a grand scale, such features of Mao's past campaigns as setting traps for leaders he has already decided to purge (i.e., giving them jobs which cannot possibly be done right), and setting "tests" for those he is undecided about while providing no clear criteria for passing those tests. He finds scapegoats for his own errors, and creates new opponents by his arbitrary behavior and decisions. He relies primarily

on ignorant fanatics to carry out his program, thereby affording opportunities to ambitious underlings to advance themselves and destroy their enemies under the pretext of being faithful to Mao and to his "thought." And he punishes cruelly those he feels have "failed" him.

The role that Madame Mao has come to play in itself argues strongly that Mao has dominated and continues to dominate the leadership. It is most unlikely that any other leader would have given the Madame such position and authority. The role of the Madame in the "revolution" has illustrated both Mao's increasing isolation and his "revolutionary" contempt for such isolation, which is really a contempt for other leaders. He appears supremely confident that no matter how much the others are alienated, they will not or cannot effectively combine against him and prevail. The most interesting question of the "revolution" is whether he is right about that.

Inherent Instability

The fact that it is the regime in power that is conducting the "revolution" in China does not necessarily give the situation an inherent instability. Theoretically the leaders could manage the affair. As Mao says, there is no necessary conflict between the desire to purge and the desire to build. Bad institutions and bad men can be brought down, and good institutions and good men can be found or developed to replace them. But in the present case of China's "cultural revolution," the defects in the character of the principal figure, and the irrationality of his thought and practice, make it impossible for the "revolution" to follow an orderly course or to arrive at a stable end. Mao can accept periods of relative moderation and quiescence (all of his campaigns allow for these), and he can engage in some construction concurrently with destruction (as he in fact has done, since early 1967), but he is heavily committed to carrying the revolution through "to the end"--which seems to mean in practice the continuing purge and weakening of the very structures he is seeking to build. This has already happened to the

central CRG and the PLA/CRG, special organizations formed by and for the "revolution." It is beginning to happen to the new revolutionary committees, and will probably happen to any new party apparatus formalized at the Ninth Congress. The destructive process may not occur on the scale of 1966-67 (which was a time of outright anarchy, rather than instability), and, in fact, each convulsion might be weaker and might claim fewer victims. But Mao apparently wants the process to continue on a scale sufficient to keep China in a state of turmoil. And as he further disrupts his already severely disordered society, he further cuts away his already narrow base of support among those capable of contributing substantially to the constructive features of his program (i.e., people like Chou En-lai, Li Fu-chün, Nieh Jung-chen, and Chen Yi, as distinct from the theorists and fanatics like Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, and most other officers of the special groups set up to conduct the purge). A high degree of instability is evident in the tension among individual leaders and in the pronouncements of the party press. Instability is apparent in the leadership's current line that it must chart a precarious passage between the right and the "ultra left," constantly in danger of attack from either extreme, and constantly threatened by those who pretend to be supporting Mao but are really "double-dealers." In such turbulent seas, so the line goes, only the "great helmsman" can be sure where the boat is and where it is supposed to be going.

Divisions in the Leadership

No large group of party and military leaders could be expected to be united on an undertaking as extreme as the "cultural revolution." Moreover, the revolution was conceived to wipe out resistance--whether conscious or unconscious--to Mao's will; thus additional resistance and disunity was inevitable.

The picture that emerges, however, is not that of a top leadership composed of a clearly definable "radical" faction and a clearly definable "conservative" faction

locked in a struggle for power or influence in which changes in policy can be attributed to the "victory" of one faction over the other. For one thing, all of the principal leaders have been concerned with both the destructive and the constructive elements of Mao's venture. For another, the groups described with these terms have not been stable. Both loosely-defined groups have been heavily purged, and the leaders of each have sometimes taken the initiative to rehabilitate or to purge or criticize lesser figures of the group (e.g. the Madame purging the "ultraleftists" of the central CRG, Chou En-lai criticizing Chen Yi). But of greatest importance, Mao has remained above both groups, has assigned their roles to both groups and to their leaders, and has been the ultimate arbiter as to which persons are to prosper and which are to fall. In other words, the vacillation in Peking's policies has reflected primarily Mao's own unsteadiness and caprice as the "helmsman."

Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, there have been important differences of disposition and inclination among Mao's lieutenants--differences which support the concept of "groups" and which have seemed to be sharpening. In the course of the "revolution," those around Mao have seemed to sort themselves out into (a) the true Maoists, those who are temperamentally inclined to a militant (even fanatical) course and have happily played the leading roles in the purges, and (b) those who are inclined toward order and stability and have appeared to exercise a moderating influence when this has been possible. The first group includes Lin Piao, who is sometimes, like Mao, above the battle, and at other times fully engaged in it. Included also are the five principals of the central CRG (Chen Po-ta, Madame Mao, Kang Sheng, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan), Madame Lin Piao (who has been with Madame Mao on the PLA/CRG), and their followers at all levels, including the leaders of some of the most militant Red Guard and "revolutionary rebel" organizations. The second group is composed of government leaders such as Chou En-lai, Li Fu-chun, Nieh Jung-chen, and Chen Yi, men responsible for the practical aspects of operating the government, and most of the military leaders below Lin Piao's level. This second group

probably includes even those military leaders who have profited from the revolution like C/S Huang Yung-sheng, and those forced into key positions in conducting the purge of the PLA, such as Hsieh Fu-chih and Wu Fa-hsien. The tension and conflict between these groups have been increasingly evident, and there have probably been conscious efforts by members of each to limit the influence of the other and to discredit some of its members.

The destructive component of the "revolution" has thus far been dominant. This has given the militants the opportunity to encourage Mao to continue along lines on which he wanted from the start to go, and this closer association with Mao has meant that the militants have been in a stronger position than the relative moderates, even in periods of relative moderation. While the militants have found it expedient to sacrifice some second-level figures when their zeal has been judged excessive, the positions of the leaders has seemed comparatively secure; the relatively moderate leaders have been more heavily attacked and have lost more supporters, and only one of them--Chou En-lai, an apparently indispensable man--has seemed comparatively secure. Beyond this, the leaders of the militants have given an impression of greater cohesion, of working closely together toward agreed objectives. The relative moderates have not seemed to be a disciplined group with a "spokesman" (as Chou En-lai is frequently described). They have seemed to be organized only in the sense of recognizing a community of interest. They have tried to reduce the damage in periods of militant advance, have sometimes been able as individuals to influence Mao in those periods in which rapidly increasing disorder and the prospect of chaos have made him amenable to influence (e.g., by Chou En-lai and some military leaders in August 1967), and they have played leading roles in the administration of his policies in relatively moderate periods.

Developments in the period from September 1967 to the present (late May) illustrate pretty well the relationship between the militants and the relative moderates. In early September, in the face of greatly increased disorder, the principal figures of Mao's team (including the

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Madame) acted together to call off attacks on the PLA. They authorized the PLA to use force to prevent seizures of weapons, and they purged some of those who had most aggressively harassed the PLA. For months thereafter, although there were militant initiatives and features, the emphasis was on stabilization, the formation of alliances, the ending of factional activity, and the building of a new administrative apparatus. The militants seemed to be on the defensive, and there was speculation that these changes might have been imposed on Mao by a coalition of government and military leaders. By March there was speculation that the position of the militants had deteriorated so far that little remained of the "cultural revolution" but the name. However, the central role of Mao in calling for a "constructive" phase in September, and his continued central role since that time was confirmed in early March, at which time a group of military leaders directly challenged the militants of the central CRG around Madame Mao. Mao immediately backed the militants, purged the military leaders, launched a nationwide campaign against the "rightists," and stimulated militant factionalism among mass organizations and even in revolutionary committees. Since that time, Mao has repeatedly displayed the militants as the dominant figures of the team.

The PLA as an Instrument

The PLA as an instrument of the "cultural revolution" has suffered from Mao's style of work. It was ordered into action in January 1967 to 'support the Left' without being told how to separate the 'left' from the 'right,' it was thereafter sharply restricted and rebuked for taking its directive as a mandate to restore order, and several of its top-level officers (of the MAC) were set aside. It was then subjected to increasing attacks by the "rebels," and, when told to restore order again, it was not given the necessary authority. Many of its judgments as to the support of the 'left' were again overturned in the summer of 1967, and it was threatened with a large-scale purge. When this harshness toward the PLA

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led again to increased disorder and disruption by mass organizations, the PLA was told again in September to take action, but it was given very limited authority to use force; and, twice burned, it held to a narrow, self-protective interpretation of its orders. After it had achieved some success in restoring order during the autumn of 1967, Madame Mao again (perhaps involuntarily) stirred up the "rebels" against it. When disorder again increased, Mao's team in Peking failed to back local PLA commanders in using even the amount of force authorized in September. Finally, while Mao's team in Peking helped to reduce disorder during the winter of 1967-68 by campaigning against factionalism and showing signs of favor for some of the regional and provincial military leaders attacked by the "rebels," the collision of three PLA leaders in March 1968 with Madame Mao and the central CRG was followed by fresh criticism of the PLA and fresh incitement of the "rebels."

In the course of these events, the PLA has lost some degree of the control it had over its own affairs. Loosely responsive in the past to party organs like the Secretariat and the General Political Department, it must now respond to several special organs in addition to the MAC--the central CRG, the PLA/CRG and/or the three political work groups, and the 'Support the Left' Group. This has also made for confusion.

The PLA has been periodically held up as a model and praised by Mao and others (including the Madame), and it has gained in power, having been in military occupation of the main centers in China since early 1967 and having dominated the revolutionary committees (local administrations) formed since that time. However, it has never seemed to have the power--either at the center or in the regions and provinces--to successfully defy the central party leadership dominated by the militants; the leaders in Peking have seemed able to reorganize and purge the military commands at will.

Moreover, its increased political power has been gained at the expense of its military capabilities. It was much too small (2.5 million) to replace the party

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(20 million), it has been spread thin, its military training and weapons program have been disrupted, its combat-readiness has declined, and its morale has probably suffered.

On balance, the PLA leadership has probably been left with a greater sense of resentment than of pride. This situation contains elements of serious danger to Mao.

The PLA as an Object

In the first stage of the purge--to August 1966--the victims in the PLA, like the victims in the party, were primarily the pre-targeted, such as Lo Jui-ching, who could not have done anything to save themselves short of staging a successful coup. In the second stage--of "bombardment" by the Red Guards, to January 1967--the victims in the PLA, again like the victims in the party, were primarily those regarded as having failed the "test" (although some were really pre-targeted); that is, they handled the Red Guards poorly, or they resisted the disruptive impact of the "revolution" in their areas of concern, or they were insufficiently militant as instruments of the purge, or they had overly close associations with purged leaders. In the next stage--the early months of 1967, during which discredited party leaders outside Peking were removed from their posts in "seizures of power"--the military victims were comparatively few, as Mao needed the PLA's good will for the restoration and maintenance of order; in this stage, however, a number of PLA leaders made themselves eligible for later purging by being too hard on the "rebels." The PLA victims in the next stage--summer 1967--were some of those aggressive local military leaders, plus the insubordinate Wuhan commanders, plus those held responsible for the poor indoctrination that led to this (all of the remaining officers of the General Political Department). In the next stage--through February 1968, in which the leaders in Peking were repenting their over-reaction to the Wuhan Incident and attempting to soothe the PLA--the PLA was again given a respite from the purge, while scapegoats were found among

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second-level civilian "militants" for the policies which had offended the PLA as a whole during the summer. In the most recent stage, the high-level victims were those PLA leaders who came into conflict with the central CRG and with Madame Mao in particular. In all stages, some PLA leaders, like some party leaders, fell as a result (or partly as a result) of speculative ventures that failed--that is, attempts to dislodge or discredit other leaders who turned out to be more powerful.

Despite the inability of any individual to defend himself successfully, there has apparently not been, in any stage of the purge, any broad or coordinated effort by any group of military leaders to resist the purge. There has been maneuvering for survival--trying to deflect attacks, trying to evade or blunt directives, playing for time, and so on--but, so far as is known, there has been no attempt to coordinate resistance outside Peking or to stage a coup in order to depose Mao and get rid of Lin Piao and the other militants of the central CRG. The reason may be that Mao has never taken on a large enough group of PLA figures at one time--that is, he has brought them down in small groups, months apart, and has periodically reassured the PLA that he did not intend to carry out a large-scale purge; the one threat of such a purge, in late July 1967 (part of the over-reaction to the Wuhan Incident), was soon withdrawn.

Nevertheless, the various small, separated purges of the PLA have added up to a large-scale purge--more than half of the central military leaders (half of whom were military commanders), and about half of the regional and provincial military leaders (but mostly politicals), or, overall (including armies), an estimated one in four of the PLA's military commanders and half of its political officers. It seems certain that many or most of the remaining PLA leaders do not regard those who have fallen as guilty as charged, and that there is much resentment, as well as fear that such arbitrary criteria will be applied to themselves. Some of this feeling is doubtless focussed on Madame Mao, as she has had the starring role in carrying out the purge of the PLA, has led the attack on the leaders of almost every group purged, and has

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accused them of offenses against herself personally; but most PLA leaders surely recognize that she has been acting as Mao's instrument, and some may surmise that Mao has been using her to deflect resentment from himself.

Thus, while Mao has succeeded in purging a large number of his real and fancied opponents in the PLA as in the party, in so doing he has almost certainly increased the ranks of the alienated. This accumulated resentment of the treatment of the PLA both as instrument and as object, when combined with the well-founded fear of purges still to come, makes the PLA (the party's "gun") an explosive weapon. To topple Mao himself would probably require his assassination or a military coup, rather than some form of defiance from commanders outside Peking.

Mao's Narrowing Base

Thus far, Mao seems to view the results of the "cultural revolution" as worth their staggering cost in terms of social disorder, economic dislocation, popular demoralization, and disruption of the military establishment. As he seems to view the situation, he has successfully purged those whom he wanted to purge, even though the numbers go far beyond his earlier calculations. As he sees it, he is separating the true believers from the revisionists, and creating "revolutionary successors" from the young. He also seems to believe that he is building a new and better governing apparatus, and that in so doing he is making additional contributions to Communist doctrine and practice.

To an outside observer, however, the dominant impression of the past two years is how narrow Mao's base of support has become--much smaller, one would think, than even Mao believes it to be. This consequence of the "revolution" is clearly illustrated by the composition of the small group which Mao and Lin began in May to present as their first team. The team consists mainly of Mao and Lin and eight others who have risen in and on the

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"cultural revolution" and have been in charge of the special instruments of the "revolution"--the two wives (both former actresses), three propagandists, and three policemen. It includes only two military leaders in addition to Lin (Huang Yung-sheng and Wu Fa-hsien) and only one or two government leaders (Chou En-lai, and Li Fu-chun sometimes). Of the 13 or 14, only four or five (Mao, Lin, Chou, Kang Sheng, and Li if included) were on the first team when the "revolution" began.

The status of Madame Mao both illustrates and contributes to the narrowing of Mao's base in the central leadership. Part of the problem is the deterioration of Mao's judgment. Ten years or even five years ago he would not have imposed his wife on other leaders; he would have found someone else to do the job. The same point can be made for Mao and Lin as a partnership, by pointing to the role of Madame Lin as well; Lin's wife may soon have, if she does not already have, a role second only to Mao's wife in conducting the ongoing purge of the PLA.

There seems no doubt that other party and military leaders--including some on the first team--resent the status of Madame Mao (and the emerging status of Madame Lin, although she is not yet on the same level and is not yet accorded the same veneration). It was bad enough when Mao alone had to be treated as infallible and sacrosanct: now there are two of them, and the second is, if anything, more irrational, suspicious, vain, and vindictive than the first.

Although Madame Mao and other members of the first team have defended and praised one another, there is evidence of disagreement between the Madame and some of them on the conduct of the "revolution." The military leaders on whom Mao's position--the position of the entire first team--directly depends are probably those who most resent Madame Mao, and Madame Lin as well. The "revolution" in itself has given the military leaders much additional reason to dislike and distrust both Mao and Lin. And nothing could be better calculated than the roles of the two women in purging the PLA to provoke additional resentment--to the point of alienation--on the part of Chinese military men: as Chinese, as military, and as men.

In addition to the narrowness of Mao's base among central leaders, it is hard to believe that the military figures who dominate most of the revolutionary committees throughout China are truly reliable "revolutionary successors," or that the rehabilitated party figures are. It is not credible that military and party leaders who have been put through what these men have in the past three years would come out of it as dedicated servants of the man who put them through it. While they may be so awed by or frightened of Mao that they will try to do what he says (when they understand what it is), they would seem to be poor material for "revolutionary" programs. Mao himself may see them this way, and may plan to replace them when he has developed more promising leaders among the young.

Mao has made some stupendous mistakes in recent years. The "hundred flowers" campaign ended by alienating the intellectuals whom it was originally designed to enlist, and led to the systematic attacks on Mao and his policies which persuaded him that another "revolution" was necessary. The "great leap forward" was another and worse disaster, setting the Chinese economy back by some years. The dispute with the Soviet party and thereafter with other parties further damaged the economy, left China without an important military ally, and left the Chinese party with the Albanian and New Zealand parties and a number of quarreling splinter groups as political allies. In the present case, the "cultural revolution" too has been a disaster for China on at least that scale. It is not clear whether it is to be a disaster for Mao personally--that is, will lead to his overthrow by others led by the military--but his position seems to be in greater danger than it has ever been.

PROSPECTS

China's political situation will remain unstable. So long as Mao dominates the leadership, his personal instability will be the central reason for this; he will work toward fantastic ends through irrational and often conflicting policies, will periodically redefine the "correct" position in terms to protect himself, and will purge those who have failed him. Moreover, his team is mismatched, and there will continue to be tension and conflict among its elements. If Mao dies or is set aside, a period of even greater instability is likely.

The revolutionary committees are also inherently unstable, and there will continue to be conflict among their three elements, each contending with the other two. This will lead to periodic purges, and may become serious enough to force Mao to prolong or return to a de facto military occupation of much of China.

A Ninth Party Congress may yet be held in 1968, although Mao's spokesmen have seemed to be retreating from this. In any case, the militants are likely to be predominant in the new politburo and secretariat. While these militants are likely to dominate the process of constructing the new party apparatus throughout China, a conflict may be building in the camp of the militants --between the central CRG on one hand and Lin Piao on the other. That is, if Kang Sheng and Madame Mao are to run the new secretariat (taking over from the central CRG), they presumably have an interest in keeping military leaders--who now dominate the revolutionary committees--out of key party posts throughout China, and getting their own followers in; but Lin Piao, looking ahead to the succession, may want military leaders to occupy key party posts concurrently.

Mao's team seems likely (as it has been implying in recent weeks) to carry the purges further. This would mean to take harsher action against the former leaders already disgraced (Liu Shao-chi et al.), to bring down some of those "rehabilitated" in the course of the revolution, and to discover "hidden" counter-revolutionaries

among party and military leaders not yet touched. (If not, it will probably mean that Mao is being blocked.) In any case, so long as Mao continues to dominate the leadership, there will be periodic purges; his style of work requires that, with every upsurge of the "revolution," some of those who opposed it must fall, and, with every retreat, some scapegoats must be found for "excesses." It is idle to prophesy which individuals will fall; except for Lin Piao and Madame Mao (the fall of either of whom would probably mean that Mao himself was on the way out), no one seems entirely secure, not even the other leaders of the central CRG or Chou En-lai. Several of the central and regional military leaders seem particularly insecure, in the wake of the Yang Cheng-wu case.

The greatest danger to Mao's own position will continue to lie in the threat he poses to others, in particular his further purges of the PLA. The worst of all mistakes would seem to be to give Madame Mao a really free hand. Apart from the possibility of assassination by an isolated individual with a grievance, Mao might provoke PLA leaders (other than Lin) to combine against him--in the form of a coup, planned in Peking and carried out either there or on one of Mao's tours. He might provoke this by taking action which would be seen as presaging the general decline of the military, or by again threatening the PLA (as in July 1967) with a large-scale further purge of central and regional leaders, or, conceivably, by threatening Chou En-lai, who is probably regarded by PLA leaders as being at least as much their champion as Lin Piao is. (A coup against Mao would probably be also a coup against Lin Piao as the foremost Maoist.) Mao's base of support seems already so narrow that he might be unable to protect himself if other key figures--who seem at best to be qualified supporters of the old man--come to believe that their survival is at stake. To spell it out: he might have so few supporters left among the military that none of those who were approached to join a coup, or who learned of it through other means, would tip him off. (This is essentially what happened to Khrushchev.)

Mao may die or become disabled at any time. In this event, instability would be expected to increase in the short term, as it always does in a Communist succession. And it might increase greatly, if the successor tries to carry out the revolution along Mao's lines "to the end." That is, the designated successor (Lin Piao) will probably in fact succeed to the post, he may really be as dedicated as he seems, and he may surround himself with other militants, but there is probably only a handful of Chinese leaders who genuinely share Mao's vision--which is essentially that of unending "struggle," with brief periods of remission--and who would cooperate to that end. (In other words, Mao has failed to produce any significant number of reliable "revolutionary" successors"; Maoism without Mao is not viable.) On this reading, Lin either would change or would lose control of the forces around Chou En-lai and of a large part of the military, and there would then be a serious "struggle for power" (thus far, under Mao's domination, a secondary feature of the "revolution"). Lin's assets among other leaders, in a struggle along these lines, would not be overwhelming; even if Lin has the cooperation of the other militants (of the central CRG), these are almost certainly not held in high esteem by other leaders (Madame Mao herself would not be an important factor; she might not even survive Mao), and, moreover, they have probably not yet developed a strong base of supporters. Thus Lin's effective support would have to come from elements of the PLA and of the police (control of which is now divided between the central CRG and the MAC), supported by armed Red Guard and "revolutionary rebel" organizations. Ranged in opposition would be other elements of the PLA and of the police, supported by other mass organizations. A struggle could conceivably continue for years. But it seems more likely that Lin Piao would modify the "revolution" (in the course of which he might have to dispose of some of the other present militants in order to preserve his own position), and that he in turn would be succeeded by a group of leaders who would modify it further. Thus Mao's virulent doctrines would become attenuated and die out--until such time, perhaps, as another group of leaders were to despair of solving China's problems by conventional means and were to turn back to the fanatical old visionary.

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